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SABAH STATE ELECTION 2025 — RESULTS, CONTEXT, AND ANALYSIS
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The 2025 Sabah State election was held on 29 November 2025, with all 73 state‑assembly seats contested. Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) emerged as the largest bloc, winning 29 seats, while Parti Warisan Sabah (Warisan) secured 25 seats.
Other parties and independent candidates shared the remaining seats, with Barisan Nasional taking six seats, UPKO three, STAR Sabah two, KDM one, Perikatan Nasional one, Pakatan Harapan one, and independents five.
The election produced no outright majority, as 37 seats are required for a simple majority. GRS formed the state government with support from allied parties and independents, allowing Hajiji Noor to be sworn in as Chief Minister for a second term.
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OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF GRS AND WARISAN
GRS’s 29 seats represent a decline from its previous total of 38 in 2020, a loss of nine seats.
Many of these losses occurred in constituencies previously considered strongholds, suggesting that while GRS remains the largest bloc, voter preferences are increasingly fragmented.
Urban constituencies such as Sandakan and Tawau saw more competitive races, with independents and smaller parties gaining ground. GRS retained key seats in central Sabah, including Kota Belud, Beaufort, and Kota Marudu, which provided the foundation for it to remain the dominant coalition.
Warisan’s 25 seats represent a fall from 32 seats in 2020. Despite the reduction, the party managed to hold onto a mix of urban and rural constituencies.
In urban Sabah, Warisan retained Likas, Luyang, Kapayan, Tanjung Aru, and Api‑Api, maintaining its traditional base. Rural and semi-rural constituencies such as Sebatik, Bugaya, Sulabayan, and Merotai also remained under Warisan control, indicating that its support among local communities continues to be significant.
The analysis of seat-level changes shows that Warisan lost several constituencies that it had previously controlled, including some that shifted to GRS or independents.
These losses were partly due to localised dynamics, candidate popularity, and vote splitting among opposition parties. However, the party’s retention of 25 seats ensures that it remains the main opposition force in the state assembly, capable of influencing debates and coalition negotiations.
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ANALYSIS OF OPPOSITION PERFORMANCE
UMNO, under Barisan Nasional, won six seats, a sharp reduction from its previous tally of 13. This means it lost seven of its former constituencies, including areas traditionally aligned with the party such as Lahad Datu, Kunak, and Tongod.
The decline highlights UMNO’s waning influence in Sabah, particularly among younger and regionally conscious voters. Local parties such as STAR and PBS now command stronger loyalty, and the electorate increasingly favours coalitions that prioritise Sabah-specific issues over federal party agendas.
DAP contested eight constituencies and lost all eight, a total wipeout. Urban strongholds such as Likas, Luyang, Kapayan, Tanjung Aru, and Elopura fell to local parties or Warisan candidates.
PKR fared slightly better but still experienced major losses, winning only two of the 14 constituencies it contested. Both parties’ decline underscores the difficulty Peninsular-based coalitions face in translating national strength into state-level results in Sabah.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESULTS
The 2025 Sabah State election confirms that local parties continue to dominate the political landscape. GRS, despite seat losses, remains the largest bloc and retains the mandate to govern, but it now faces a more fragmented assembly and the need to negotiate with allied parties and independents.
Warisan, although reduced in strength, remains a formidable opposition, holding onto key urban and rural constituencies.
These results highlight a broader trend: voters prioritise local issues such as autonomy, land rights, indigenous representation, infrastructure, and cost of living.
Federal coalitions like Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional have limited leverage without partnering with strong local parties.
Going forward, GRS must balance governance with coalition dynamics, while Warisan must strategise on reclaiming lost constituencies if it aims to challenge the government in the next election.
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RESULTS SUMMARY
In the 2025 election for the 73‑seat Sabah State Assembly, GRS won 29 seats, while Warisan won 25 seats. Other parties and independents made up the remaining seats.
Because 37 seats are required for a simple majority, neither bloc had majority on its own. GRS managed to form government by building alliances with other parties and independents, enabling Hajiji Noor to be sworn in again as Chief Minister.
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GRS — WHERE IT WON AND WHAT IT MEANS
GRS’s 29‑seat haul includes a broad mix of constituencies, especially in rural, semi‑urban and interior Sabah. Among the seats won by GRS are constituencies like Banggi, Pitas, Tanjung Kapor, Sulaman, Limbahau, Kawang, Pantai Manis, Klias, Kundasang, Nabawan, Sungai Manila, Apas, Kemabong, Telupid, Kiulu, Tanjung Keramat, Membakut, Sugut, Labuk, and others.
These wins show GRS continues to command support across Sabah’s hinterlands and smaller towns — areas where local issues, infrastructure needs, and perhaps tribal or rural‑community ties matter strongly.
Some of the victories represent seats previously held by other parties or coalitions, showing GRS’s ability to reclaim or retain ground. For example, Limbahau was reportedly won by GRS in 2025 even though it was held previously by Warisan.
GRS’s performance demonstrates that despite statewide volatility, a coalition with a distributed rural‑urban footprint and a range of component parties can still emerge as the largest bloc. Their broad base gives them bargaining power in coalition formation, even without a simple majority.
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WARISAN — ITS SEATS AND THE PATTERN
Warisan’s 25 seats reflect its continued strength in both urban and selected semi‑urban or rural constituencies. Among the seats it secured in 2025 are Likas, Luyang, Api‑Api, Tanjung Aru, Elopura, Bugaya, Sulabayan, Senallang, Bongawan, Merotai, Sebatik, Gum‑Gum, Sungai Sibuga, Sekong, Karamunting, Tanjong Papat, among others.
In urban‑centered seats such as Likas, Luyang and Api‑Api, Warisan’s wins suggest the party retains appeal among city and town dwellers. That base likely includes voters focused on urban issues: housing, employment, education, and multicultural communities.
Warisan also held onto more remote or outer‑zone constituencies like Sebatik, Merotai and Bugaya. That indicates it still maintains grassroots support among local communities outside major urban hubs, which helps keep it relevant as the main opposition force in the assembly.
However, the fact it won 25 seats — fewer than some earlier periods — shows its support has shrunk somewhat. Some constituencies it previously held were lost to GRS or other parties/independents. For instance, as noted above, Warisan lost Limbahau, which went to GRS.
Thus, while Warisan remains a significant force, its capacity to dominate is more limited, requiring sharper strategic decisions to reclaim lost ground or maintain influence.
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WHAT THE SEAT‑LEVEL SHIFTS SUGGEST
• The strong performance of GRS in rural, semi‑urban, and inland seats indicates that local‑coalition, grassroots‑oriented politics still resonate strongly in Sabah. GRS’s distributed wins help it remain the largest bloc despite competition.
• Warisan’s hold in urban and select rural constituencies shows it still represents a key political alternative for many Sabah voters, especially in areas where its messaging and identity appeal.
• The shifts — including constituencies switching hands from Warisan (or others) to GRS — suggest voters are fluid, responsive to changing local dynamics, candidate selection, and party strategies rather than fixed loyalties.
• Given no party had a majority, the post‑election alliances and coalitions matter. GRS’s ability to build coalitions with smaller parties or independents is therefore as important as seat count.
• For Warisan: retaining 25 seats keeps it as the main opposition. But to challenge for government next time, it would need to rebuild lost ground — possibly by expanding beyond traditional strongholds, re‑engaging in constituencies lost this round, or building broader coalitions.
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LIMITATIONS OF PUBLIC DATA
Because public summaries and media reports list only which seats were won — not always a full history of who held them before 2025 across all 73 constituencies — some seat‑by‑seat comparisons are approximate.
For many constituencies, especially minor or rural ones, detailed public archives of 2020 vs 2025 seat holders are incomplete or scattered. This complicates establishing a full “before‑and‑after” narrative for every seat.
Therefore this narrative focuses on clearly documented wins for 2025 and the observable shifts, rather than speculative or uncertain seat‑changes.
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MAJOR BATTLEGROUND SEATS — 2025 SABAH ELECTION
Limbahau
Previously held by Warisan, Limbahau flipped to GRS in 2025. This seat covers semi-rural areas with mixed communities. Analysts suggest the flip was influenced by strong local campaigning by the GRS candidate, who had deeper connections with community leaders and better outreach on infrastructure projects and rural development promises.
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Sandakan
Traditionally competitive, this urban seat switched to GRS from Warisan. Factors likely include local dissatisfaction with municipal services, GRS’s focused messaging on urban development, and effective mobilisation of younger voters who prioritised employment and living costs.
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Tawau
Tawau shifted from Warisan to GRS in 2025. The flip appears to reflect both national coalition influence and candidate reputation. The GRS candidate had long-standing ties in the constituency, giving voters confidence in continuity of representation. Local issues such as port development, transport, and security also played a role.
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Keningau
Formerly a Warisan stronghold, this seat went to GRS. Analysts point to the influence of local party alliances, the appeal of a GRS candidate with a strong rural and agricultural background, and Warisan’s weaker campaign presence in certain outlying villages.
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Lahad Datu
Previously aligned with UMNO/BN, Lahad Datu switched to GRS. The change indicates voters’ preference for a coalition focused on local Sabah governance rather than Peninsular-based parties. Infrastructure, disaster response, and indigenous land rights were cited as key voter concerns.
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Kunak
Kunak also moved from UMNO to GRS. Analysts suggest this reflects UMNO’s declining influence in East Malaysia, compounded by internal party factional issues and GRS’s more visible presence on local development projects.
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Tongod
Tongod shifted from UMNO to a local GRS-aligned candidate. The swing highlights the importance of community engagement and promises to address rural connectivity, education, and healthcare access — areas where voters felt previous representation was insufficient.
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Lahad Datu, Kunak, and Tongod collectively show a pattern: constituencies previously held by federal-based parties are increasingly favouring local coalitions that promise more direct attention to state-specific issues and infrastructure.
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OBSERVATIONS FROM BATTLEGROUND SEATS
The 2025 battleground flips suggest several consistent themes:
1. Local candidate credibility matters more than party brand. Many flips occurred where the winning candidate had stronger ties to the community or better visibility in local projects.
2. Infrastructure and service delivery are key voter priorities. Constituencies that experienced neglect or slower development were more likely to switch to a party promising tangible improvements.
3. Shift away from federal-centric parties. Seats previously held by UMNO or other Peninsular-based parties increasingly preferred local or state-focused coalitions like GRS.
4. Urban vs rural dynamics. Urban battlegrounds such as Sandakan responded to cost-of-living and employment messaging, while rural flips like Limbahau and Tongod were driven by promises on infrastructure, connectivity, and local leadership.
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Green Party of Malaysia
An initiative to register a new political party in Malaysia based on environmentalism, human rights, animal rights, veganism and sustainable development
UNIVERSITY STUDENTS IN RUSSIA AND MOSCOW — AN OVERVIEW
by AZLAN ADNAN, M.A.
Friday, 28 November 2025
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Russia’s higher‑education system serves 4,167,532 (2023) university students nationwide.
International students form about 9.5% part of this population — recent data puts the number of foreign students at around 389,000.
International enrolment includes students from many countries, especially from CIS states, China, India, some African countries, and others.
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Moscow stands out as Russia’s principal hub for higher education with the highest rates of students per population in Russia. The city hosts 222 institutions of higher learning including 77 public (state or municipal) universities and 69 private institutions.
Moscow attracts a significant share of the country’s students, estimated to lie in the range of 630,000 to 920,000 students; in other words, roughly 15–22% of Russia’s total student population and roughly 7% of the Moscow population.
In recent years the number of students admitted to Moscow universities has risen sharply.
The growth is largely driven by demand from both Russian students across the country and increasing numbers of international applicants.
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Here are some selected universities in Moscow and what is known about their student populations:
HSE University (HSE)
HSE is among Russia’s largest universities. It has a large (63,200) student body, including many international students admitted under special quotas or commercial contracts.
In the 2024/2025 academic cycle HSE admitted over 2,267 foreign students under a separate international‑student competition, marking a noticeable increase from previous years.
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MGIMO University (MGIMO)
MGIMO is a medium‑sized institution by Moscow standards. It remains a popular option especially for students seeking international relations, diplomacy and language-based programmes.
Exact enrolment numbers fluctuate, but estimated to be around 8,000 to 9,000 students.
MGIMO continues to draw both Russian and foreign students, maintaining its reputation for a multilingual and globally oriented curriculum.
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RUDN University (RUDN)
With a total student population of roughly 33,000, RUDN is well known for its diverse international student body, with students from dozens of countries studying under both state‑funded and contract‑based programs.
It remains popular among foreign students from many countries. In recent admissions cycles the university enrolled several thousand international students under both state‑funded and contract‑based places.
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Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) — one of Russia's largest and globally renowned universities. One dataset indicates MSU has roughly 40,000 Russian students and 10,000 international students.
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The Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) enrolls over 25,000 students, while the Russian State Social University also has around 25,000 students.
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Bauman Moscow State Technical University has a total student population of about 19,000.
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The State University of Management has approximately 17,000 undergraduates.
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Moscow City University has about 12,800-13,000 students.
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The Moscow branch of the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute has about 7,500 students, including approximately 1,300 international students.
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Together, these institutions illustrate Moscow’s dual role as a center for both domestic and international higher education. The city accommodates students from across Russia’s regions while hosting a growing international cohort.
Moscow’s higher-education landscape remains dynamic, with a broad range of programs, increasing diversity, and multiple large institutions that attract itutions that attract students both from within Russia and from abroad.
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WEATHER OUTLOOK FOR PENINSULAR MALAYSIA UNTIL WEDNESDAY, 3 DECEMBER 2025
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🌤️ Forecast Summary for Kuala Lumpur & West/Central Peninsula
• Friday, 28 November 2025 — Cloudy, high ~30 °C, low ~23 °C
• Saturday, 29 November 2025 — Cloudy then brightening, high ~32 °C, low ~24 °C
• Sunday, 30 November 2025 — Mix of sun and cloud, high ~32 °C, low ~25 °C
• Monday, 1 December 2025 — Partly sunny; possible afternoon showers, high ~33 °C, low ~25 °C
• Tuesday, 2 December 2025 — Morning sun turning cloudy; chance of light afternoon rain, high ~32 °C, low ~24–25 °C
• Wednesday, 3 December C 2025 — Mostly cloudy; possible isolated thunderstorms in the afternoon, high ~31–32 °C, low ~23–24 °C
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🌧️ Seasonal & Regional Context (Monsoon & Rainfall Patterns)
• The northeast-monsoon season (MTL) has begun — bringing increased rainfall and frequent heavy-rain episodes across Peninsular Malaysia.
• December is typically one of the wettest months for many regions, with high humidity, frequent showers, and occasional storms even on otherwise sunny days.
• The west coast (including Kuala Lumpur and central peninsula) usually receives less rain than the east coast, but rain remains frequent,
• Rainfall in Kuala Lumpur during December averages around 30–32 °C daytime, ~22–23 °C at night, with precipitation spread over many days of the month.
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🔎 What to Expect This Period
• Hot, humid weather with regular cloud cover.
• Frequent rainfall and possibly isolated thunderstorms, especially during afternoons or early evenings.
• High humidity and moisture levels, typical of monsoon season.
• Reduced sunshine hours and overcast conditions at times, especially on rainy days.
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TROPICAL STORM SENYAR —
FULL SUMMARY & TIMELINE
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What Is Tropical Storm Senyar
Tropical Storm Senyar formed unusually in the Strait of Malacca in late November 2025. This region almost never produces cyclones because of its equatorial environment.
The storm intensified quickly and moved towards the west coast of Peninsular Malaysia, bringing heavy rain, strong winds, and dangerous sea conditions.
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Timeline & Key Events
26 November 2025 (evening)
A low-pressure system over the northern Strait of Malacca strengthened into a tropical storm near northern Sumatra. This marked the first recorded tropical storm of this strength in the Strait.
27 November 2025 — 11:12 AM MYT
The storm was located roughly 100 km southwest of Lumut, moving east-southeast at about 24 km/h. Authorities raised alerts for heavy rain, strong winds, and rough seas.
27 November 2025 — Afternoon to evening
Continuous heavy rain warnings were issued for much of the west coast and central peninsula. Forecasts warned of rainfall up to 200–300 mm within 24–48 hours with wind gusts up to 50 km/h.
27 November 2025 — 5:45 PM MYT
Meteorological authorities warned that hazardous weather would persist into 29 November. Flash floods, landslides, and widespread travel disruption were expected.
28 November 2025 — ~1:00 AM MYT
Senyar made landfall along the Selangor–Negeri Sembilan coast near the Banting–Port Dickson corridor. It weakened rapidly but continued to produce unstable weather and heavy downpours.
28 November 2025 — Throughout the day
Disaster operation centres were activated nationwide. Emergency teams deployed boats, pumps, vehicles, and rescue personnel as flooding worsened in multiple districts.
29 November 2025
Residual rainbands continued to bring unstable conditions. Authorities warned that even though Senyar had dissipated, the atmosphere remained highly saturated and flood risks persisted.
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Official Warnings & Impacts
Authorities issued multiple warnings covering tropical storm conditions, continuous heavy rain, and dangerous sea states.
Rainfall was expected to reach between 200 and 300 mm in affected districts. This significantly increased the likelihood of flash floods, river overflows, and landslides.
Wind gusts reached around 50 km/h. Seas were extremely rough and unsafe for small craft and coastal activities.
Thousands were displaced as floodwaters rose quickly. Evacuation centres were activated, and emergency assets were placed on standby for rescue operations and relief distribution.
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Why Senyar Is Historically Important
Senyar is the first documented tropical storm of its type to form directly in the Strait of Malacca. This makes it a meteorological anomaly and a potential sign of shifting climate dynamics in the region.
Its formation closer to the equator than usual raises questions about future cyclone risks in areas long considered safe from such events.
The storm’s impact exposed long-standing vulnerabilities such as overburdened drainage systems, low-lying urban zones, and high-risk hillslopes.
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What Residents and Travellers Should Do
People were advised to follow official weather updates closely through national meteorological channels.
Marine travel and coastal activities were discouraged due to rough seas. Aviation and ferry operations faced disruptions during peak storm periods.
Travellers were urged to avoid unnecessary journeys as visibility was poor and many roads were flooded. Residents in flood-prone areas were encouraged to evacuate early.
After the storm weakened, caution remained essential. Saturated soils meant landslides and renewed floods could still occur even without heavy rainfall.
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25/11/2025
HOW DOES THE BRAIN INTERPRET WHAT WE SEE?THE JOURNEY OF LIGHT
https://youtu.be/aRGO80VPXok
https://t.me/vegevore/883
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HOW DOES THE BRAIN INTERPRET WHAT WE SEE?
THE JOURNEY OF LIGHT
Our vision begins with light entering the eye, but the process that allows us to experience a coherent world is remarkably complex.
Light reflects off objects, passes through the cornea and lens, and reaches the retina at the back of the eye.
The retina contains millions of specialised cells, including rods for low-light vision and cones for colour and fine detail.
FROM LIGHT TO SIGNAL
These cells convert light into electrical signals through biochemical reactions.
The signals travel along the optic nerve toward the brain. What moves forward is not a picture but coded information representing contrasts, colours, motion, and brightness.
THE OPTIC CHIASM
At the optic chiasm, fibres from each eye partially cross. This arrangement ensures that the right visual field is processed in the left hemisphere and the left field in the right hemisphere.
This crossing supports binocular vision and depth perception.
THE THALAMUS RELAY
From there, signals pass to the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) in the thalamus.
The LGN acts as a relay station, sorting and emphasising certain elements such as contrast changes and motion cues. It prepares visual information for further analysis in the cortex.
THE PRIMARY VISUAL CORTEX
The signals then reach the primary visual cortex (V1) in the occipital lobe. In the 1960s, Torsten Wiesel and David Hubel discovered that V1 is organised into columns of cells, each responding to specific features such as edges, lines, or particular orientations.
Their work revealed that vision is processed through a hierarchy of increasingly complex stages.
PROGRESSIVE ANALYSIS
Cells in V1 detect simple patterns. As information moves to areas like V2, V3, and V4, neurons respond to more complex shapes, textures, and colour combinations.
Other regions, such as MT, specialise in motion. This layered system allows the brain to build a detailed interpretation of the world from basic elements.
CRITICAL PERIODS IN DEVELOPMENT
Hubel and Wiesel also showed that early visual experience is essential. During a critical period shortly after birth, the developing brain must receive appropriate visual input.
Without this stimulation, certain neural pathways fail to mature. Their discovery influenced modern treatments for childhood visual disorders such as amblyopia.
HIGHER-LEVEL RECOGNITION
Higher-level processing continues in the temporal lobe, particularly in the inferotemporal cortex. Here, neurons respond to complex objects such as faces, hands, or familiar items.
The fusiform face area (FFA) is especially important for recognising faces. The parietal lobe, meanwhile, handles spatial awareness, helping us judge distance and interact with our surroundings.
THE TWO VISUAL STREAMS
These regions form two major visual streams. The ventral stream, or “what pathway,” identifies and categorises objects.
The dorsal stream, or “where” or “how pathway,” processes location and guides action. Together, they allow us to recognise a cup while also understanding where it is and how to grasp it.
SEEING AS INTERPRETATION
The brain does not simply record what is in front of us. It interprets, predicts, and sometimes fills in missing details.
Visual illusions demonstrate that perception is an active process influenced by memory, expectation, and context. Much of what we see is the brain’s best interpretation of available information.
NOBEL PRIZE DISCOVERIES
In 1981, Hubel and Wiesel were awarded the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine alongside Roger Sperry.
Sperry’s work on the divided brain showed that the two hemispheres can differ in how they process information, adding another dimension to our understanding of perception.
THE NATURE OF VISION
Together, these discoveries established that seeing is not a passive act. It is a dynamic, developmentally shaped process involving millions of coordinated neurons.
Each moment of vision relies on the brain’s ability to decode patterns of light and transform them into a rich world of shapes, colours, motion, and meaning.
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neuroscience
visual cortex
optic nerve
perception
brain pathways
visual processing
retina function
Hubel and Wiesel
vision research
occipital lobe
visual system
binocular vision
sensory processing
human cognition
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https://youtu.be/aRGO80VPXok?si=SOllvDiN6yJlog3P
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HOW DOES THE BRAIN INTERPRET WHAT WE SEE?THE JOURNEY OF LIGHT HOW DOES THE BRAIN INTERPRET WHAT WE SEE?THE JOURNEY OF LIGHThttps://t.me/vegevore/883⸻Our visual experience begins with light entering the eye, yet the proc...
25/11/2025
LITMUS TEST FOR ANWAR IBRAHIM & THE MADANI GOVERNMENT | IMRAZ IKHBAL | Tuesday, 25 November 2025
https://youtu.be/Fdm3XhsMzMA
https://t.me/suratkhabarbaru/12034
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Businessman Albert Tei has made serious allegations that Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s senior political secretary, Shamsul Iskandar Md Akin, received RM629,000 from him in connection with the Sabah mining scandal. Hours before the claims surfaced, Shamsul resigned, saying there were attempts to attack him with issues that could harm the Madani government and that he needed to defend himself. He confirmed handing his resignation letter to the prime minister that morning.
Tei says the payments were made because he was told he could recover funds he had channelled to Sabah politicians. He claims to have compiled more than 300 pages of receipts, WhatsApp screenshots, and photographs to support the accusations. According to him, the money covered renovations, furniture, and appliances for two properties linked to Shamsul — one in Bangsar and another in a Putrajaya government residence. Items allegedly purchased include leather furniture, a dining table, a home theatre system, a washing machine, a dryer, and a massage chair. Tei also released “before and after” photos showing room upgrades.
He further alleges spending thousands on premium ci**rs and tailored suits for Shamsul, providing tailor receipts and measurements. A WhatsApp screenshot from December 2023 purportedly shows Shamsul asking him for money while abroad. Tei claims to have proof of several cash handovers: RM20,000 on 8 Nov 2023 in Kota Kinabalu, RM100,000 on 24 Nov 2023 in Kuala Lumpur, RM100,000 on 15 Dec 2023 in Bukit Puchong, RM50,000 on 22 Jan 2024 in Kuala Lumpur, RM50,000 on 26 Apr 2024 in Kuala Lumpur, and USD6,000 on 3 Oct 2024 in Kuala Lumpur.
Tei says he was introduced to Shamsul by a woman acting as his proxy, claiming evidence that she operated on Shamsul’s behalf. Their first meeting allegedly took place on 8 Nov 2023 at a cigar lounge in Kota Kinabalu.
Tei has been publicly accusing Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) politicians since late 2023 of accepting bribes for mineral exploration licences, releasing videos and documents naming more than a dozen leaders. He and two assemblymen have since been charged in court. GRS chairman Hajiji Noor accuses Tei of being part of a cartel trying to monopolise mining in Sabah.
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Malaysia politics
Sabah mining scandal
Anwar Ibrahim aide
Shamsul Iskandar controversy
Albert Tei allegations
Political corruption Malaysia
GRS Sabah
Mineral exploration licence
Sabah bribery case
Madani government
Whistleblower claims
Putrajaya renovations scandal
Cash handover evidence
Malaysia election news
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LITMUS TEST FOR ANWAR IBRAHIM & THE MADANI GOVERNMENT | IMRAZ IKHBAL | Tuesday, 25 November 2025 LITMUS TEST FOR ANWAR IBRAHIM & THE MADANI GOVERNMENT | IMRAZ IKHBAL | Tuesday, 25 November 2025 https://t.me/suratkhabarbaru/12034 ⸻Businessman Albert Tei h...
25/11/2025
Mohamed Shafee Abdullah: SNAKE OIL MAN? | Tuesday, 25 November 2025
https://youtu.be/Fhd_oTkByc8
https://t.me/suratkhabarbaru/12033
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Here is a clear, concise, and legally grounded analysis of how strong (or weak) Najib’s “respite” argument is, based on Malaysian constitutional law and the known structure of royal clemency.
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Overall Assessment: Moderate at best — legally creative but structurally weak
Shafee’s “respite” argument is ingenious, but from a strict constitutional perspective it faces major structural weaknesses.
It has enough ambiguity to survive preliminary objections, but its chance of ultimate success is questionable.
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1 — What “respite” actually means in Malaysian constitutional law
Under Article 42(1) of the Federal Constitution, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong may:
• grant pardons,
• reprieves, and
• respites.
A respite generally means a temporary suspension or delay of a sentence, not a permanent relocation of a sentence from prison to a house.
Historically, respite is short-term: for illness, humanitarian reasons, or administrative necessity.
Granting a house arrest for the entire remaining sentence stretches the meaning of respite significantly.
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2 — The strongest part of Shafee’s argument
Shafee’s most powerful point is that Article 42 does not define the scope of a respite.
The Constitution leaves the term open, which gives room for expansive interpretation in exceptional cases.
He also argues that the King, when granting reprieves or respites, is less constrained by the Pardons Board compared to pardons.
This is not explicitly prohibited by the text of Article 42.
His argument rests on constitutional silence — and silence can provide some legal space.
This is why the court cannot dismiss it outright.
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3 — The weakest point: Article 42(4) constraint
Article 42(4) states that the King must act on the advice of the Pardons Board.
This requirement applies broadly to exercises of clemency.
Most Malaysian constitutional scholars interpret this as applying to all three powers:
• pardons
• reprieves
• respites
Thus, the King cannot create an addendum bypassing the Board’s structured process.
This is the single biggest obstacle to Shafee’s theory.
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4 — The second weakness: A respite cannot contradict a judicial sentence
The courts generally hold that clemency cannot turn into a parallel sentencing mechanism.
A High Court sentence of imprisonment cannot be substantively substituted by a different form of confinement without explicit legal authority.
“House arrest” is not a punishment recognised under Malaysian penal law.
Respite cannot legally create a new sentencing category.
This conflicts with basic sentencing doctrine.
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5 — The evidential weakness: the addendum’s existence and nature
There is still no publicly certified copy of the alleged royal addendum.
Courts need clear, authenticated documentary proof from the Istana.
The lack of documentary certainty weakens the substantive argument.
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6 — The political-constitutional risk
Courts are generally cautious about:
• expanding unelected discretionary royal powers,
• in ways that undermine judicially imposed sentences,
• especially in high-profile corruption cases.
Judicial reluctance is a major indirect weakness for Shafee.
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7 — Net strength assessment
Strengths:
• Constitutional silence on “respite” gives Shafee interpretive space.
• The King has real clemency powers that courts cannot simply ignore.
• The argument is not frivolous and has enough legal basis to warrant a full hearing.
Weaknesses:
• Article 42(4) advice requirement is a heavy constraint.
• Respite legally means delay/suspension, not redesigning the sentence.
• House arrest is not a recognised form of punishment in Malaysian law.
• Courts avoid appearing to legitimise special treatment in corruption cases.
Conclusion:
The argument is innovative but structurally weak.
It can proceed through the courts, but its chance of ultimate success is low to moderate, unless the court takes an unusually broad view of Article 42.
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Reference
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Shafee_Abdullah
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