Pulis Myth Buster

With petitioner's arrest being illegal, the subsequent seizure of the shabu allegedly in his possession becomes "unreasonable." At this point, it must be emphasized that petitioner's failure to question his arrest before he made his plea only affects the jurisdiction of the court over his person and does not bar him from raising the inadmissibility of the illegally seized shabu. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained during the illegal arrest.

It is settled that "reliable information" provided by police assets alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. There must be independent circumstances perceivable by the arresting officers suggesting that a criminal offense is being committed to comply with the exacting requirements of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. An accused must perform some overt act within plain view of the police officers indicating that she or "he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime." None was present in this case.

Villasana v. People, G.R. No. 209078, 04 Sept. 2019 (DRUG CHAIN OF CUSTODY and CORPUS DELICTI)

Evidence seized as a result of an illegal warrantless arrest cannot be used against an accused pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. Even if the seizure was reasonable, the arresting officers' unjustified noncompliance with the legal safeguards under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 compromises the integrity of the confiscated drug. This creates reasonable doubt on the conviction of the accused for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

The Spirit of the Honor Code guides the Corps in identifying and assessing misconduct. While cadets are interested in legal precedents in cases involving Honor violations, those who hold the Spirit of the Honor Code dare not look into these precedents for loopholes to justify questionable acts and they are not to interpret the system to their own advantage.

𝐌𝐚𝐲 𝐚 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲 𝐚 𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐜𝐡?

𝐃𝐨𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐞: 𝘈 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘷𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘥𝘰𝘦𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥, 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘺, 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩. 𝘍𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘷𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘥, 𝘪𝘵 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘧𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘻𝘦𝘥 𝘦𝘹𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘳𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘪𝘵𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘧 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘷𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘥.

𝐀𝐍𝐆𝐄𝐋𝐈𝐓𝐎 𝐑𝐈𝐃𝐎𝐍 𝐲 𝐆𝐔𝐄𝐕𝐀𝐑𝐑𝐀 𝐯𝐬. 𝐏𝐄𝐎𝐏𝐋𝐄 𝐅 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐏𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐍𝐄𝐒
𝐆𝐑. 𝐍𝐨. 𝟐𝟓𝟐𝟑𝟗𝟔 | 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝟔, 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟑
𝐋𝐎𝐏𝐄𝐙, 𝐌., 𝐉.:

𝐍𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞:
In this case, Angelito Ridon was charged with illegal possession of fi****ms and ammunition under 𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜 𝐀𝐜𝐭 𝐍𝐨. 𝟏𝟎𝟓𝟗𝟏, 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐚𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐡𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐜𝐭.

The incident occurred on August 2, 2013, in Makati City, where police officers apprehended Ridon for allegedly violating traffic rules by entering a one-way street. Upon being flagged down, Ridon attempted to flee, leading to a chase that ended with his apprehension. During the arrest, officers conducted a warrantless search and recovered a .38 caliber revolver without a serial number, loaded with six live ammunition.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Ridon, a decision later upheld by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Ridon insists that the CA erred in convicting him because there was no valid in flagrante delicto arrest to justify the warrantless search. He maintains that the police officers concerned frisked him even before he was arrested for any offense. Petitioner also avers that there was no evidence showing that he committed any crime, violated any ordinance, or acted in a manner as to rouse any suspicion when the police officers started chasing him. He adds that the police officers did not see any firearm on him. Thus, he was not yet under arrest when the police officers searched him. He further claims that the firearm is inadmissible for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be carried out with a warrant issued based on probable cause. Otherwise, applying the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 𝙒𝙝𝙞𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙥𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙞𝙥𝙡𝙚 𝙖𝙙𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨, 𝙣𝙖𝙢𝙚𝙡𝙮: (1) 𝙬𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙨𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙡 𝙩𝙤 𝙖 𝙡𝙖𝙬𝙛𝙪𝙡 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩; (2) 𝙨𝙚𝙞𝙯𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙞𝙣 𝙥𝙡𝙖𝙞𝙣 𝙫𝙞𝙚𝙬; (3) 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝 𝙤𝙛 𝙖 𝙢𝙤𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙫𝙚𝙝𝙞𝙘𝙡𝙚; (4) 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙨𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝; (5) 𝙘𝙪𝙨𝙩𝙤𝙢𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝; (6) 𝙨𝙩𝙤𝙥-𝙖𝙣𝙙-𝙛𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙠; 𝙖𝙣𝙙 (7) 𝙚𝙭𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙧𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮 𝙘𝙞𝙧𝙘𝙪𝙢𝙨𝙩𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨, none applies in this case.

Contrary to the CA's findings, the warrantless search on Angelito was not incidental to a lawful arrest. Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Indeed, there must first be a lawful arrest before a warrantless search and seizure can be made. The process cannot be reversed.

Essentially, a lawful arrest must precede the warrantless search.Arrest is the taking of a person into custody so that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense." One of the instances when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant is the in flagrante delicto arrest— as when a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. 𝙏𝙤 𝙗𝙚 𝙫𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙙, 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣 𝙛𝙡𝙖𝙜𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙚 𝙙𝙚𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩 𝙢𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙮 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙧𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙩𝙚𝙨: (𝙖) 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙤𝙣 𝙩𝙤 𝙗𝙚 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙢𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙚𝙭𝙚𝙘𝙪𝙩𝙚 𝙖𝙣 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙝𝙚 𝙝𝙖𝙨 𝙟𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙙, 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙮 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜, 𝙤𝙧 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙤 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩 𝙖 𝙘𝙧𝙞𝙢𝙚; 𝙖𝙣𝙙 (𝙗) 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙙𝙤𝙣𝙚 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙤𝙧 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙤𝙛𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙚𝙧'𝙨 𝙫𝙞𝙚𝙬.

The Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search conducted on Ridon was invalid. The Court emphasized that a traffic violation, such as entering a one-way street, does not justify an arrest but merely warrants the confiscation of the driver's license. Since there was no valid arrest, the subsequent warrantless search was deemed unlawful, rendering the seized firearm inadmissible as evidence. With no admissible evidence remaining, the Court acquitted Ridon of the charges.

𝘋𝘪𝘨𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘚𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘦 𝘍𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘩 𝘔. 𝘗𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘨, 4-𝘑𝘋, 𝘈.𝘠. 2024-2025, 𝘔𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘰 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘜𝘯𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘺 - 𝘊𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘓𝘢𝘸, 𝘐𝘭𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘯 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯.

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𝐌𝐚𝐲 𝐚 𝐭𝐫𝐚𝐟𝐟𝐢𝐜 𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐣𝐮𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐟𝐲 𝐚 𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐥𝐞𝐬𝐬 𝐬𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐜𝐡?

𝐃𝐨𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐧𝐞: 𝘈 𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘤 𝘷𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘥𝘰𝘦𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘫𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘧𝘺 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘢𝘯𝘥, 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘺, 𝘤𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘣𝘢𝘴𝘪𝘴 𝘧𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩. 𝘍𝘰𝘳 𝘢 𝘸𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘢𝘯𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘴𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘢𝘳𝘤𝘩 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘷𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘥, 𝘪𝘵 𝘮𝘶𝘴𝘵 𝘧𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘳 𝘳𝘦𝘤𝘰𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘻𝘦𝘥 𝘦𝘹𝘤𝘦𝘱𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴, 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘢 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘧𝘶𝘭 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘳𝘦𝘲𝘶𝘪𝘳𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘵 𝘪𝘵𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘧 𝘵𝘰 𝘣𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘭𝘭𝘺 𝘷𝘢𝘭𝘪𝘥.

𝐀𝐍𝐆𝐄𝐋𝐈𝐓𝐎 𝐑𝐈𝐃𝐎𝐍 𝐲 𝐆𝐔𝐄𝐕𝐀𝐑𝐑𝐀 𝐯𝐬. 𝐏𝐄𝐎𝐏𝐋𝐄 𝐅 𝐓𝐇𝐄 𝐏𝐇𝐈𝐋𝐈𝐏𝐏𝐈𝐍𝐄𝐒
𝐆𝐑. 𝐍𝐨. 𝟐𝟓𝟐𝟑𝟗𝟔 | 𝐃𝐞𝐜𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝟔, 𝟐𝟎𝟐𝟑
𝐋𝐎𝐏𝐄𝐙, 𝐌., 𝐉.:

𝐍𝐚𝐫𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞:
In this case, Angelito Ridon was charged with illegal possession of fi****ms and ammunition under 𝐑𝐞𝐩𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜 𝐀𝐜𝐭 𝐍𝐨. 𝟏𝟎𝟓𝟗𝟏, 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐚𝐬 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐂𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐡𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐅𝐢𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐫𝐦𝐬 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐀𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐑𝐞𝐠𝐮𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐀𝐜𝐭.

The incident occurred on August 2, 2013, in Makati City, where police officers apprehended Ridon for allegedly violating traffic rules by entering a one-way street. Upon being flagged down, Ridon attempted to flee, leading to a chase that ended with his apprehension. During the arrest, officers conducted a warrantless search and recovered a .38 caliber revolver without a serial number, loaded with six live ammunition.

The Regional Trial Court convicted Ridon, a decision later upheld by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Ridon insists that the CA erred in convicting him because there was no valid in flagrante delicto arrest to justify the warrantless search. He maintains that the police officers concerned frisked him even before he was arrested for any offense. Petitioner also avers that there was no evidence showing that he committed any crime, violated any ordinance, or acted in a manner as to rouse any suspicion when the police officers started chasing him. He adds that the police officers did not see any firearm on him. Thus, he was not yet under arrest when the police officers searched him. He further claims that the firearm is inadmissible for being the fruit of a poisonous tree.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be carried out with a warrant issued based on probable cause. Otherwise, applying the exclusionary rule, any evidence obtained is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. 𝙒𝙝𝙞𝙡𝙚 𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙨 𝙥𝙧𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙞𝙥𝙡𝙚 𝙖𝙙𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙨 𝙤𝙛 𝙚𝙭𝙘𝙚𝙥𝙩𝙞𝙤𝙣𝙨, 𝙣𝙖𝙢𝙚𝙡𝙮: (1) 𝙬𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙨𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝 𝙞𝙣𝙘𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙖𝙡 𝙩𝙤 𝙖 𝙡𝙖𝙬𝙛𝙪𝙡 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩; (2) 𝙨𝙚𝙞𝙯𝙪𝙧𝙚 𝙤𝙛 𝙚𝙫𝙞𝙙𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙞𝙣 𝙥𝙡𝙖𝙞𝙣 𝙫𝙞𝙚𝙬; (3) 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝 𝙤𝙛 𝙖 𝙢𝙤𝙫𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙫𝙚𝙝𝙞𝙘𝙡𝙚; (4) 𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙬𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙡𝙚𝙨𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝; (5) 𝙘𝙪𝙨𝙩𝙤𝙢𝙨 𝙨𝙚𝙖𝙧𝙘𝙝; (6) 𝙨𝙩𝙤𝙥-𝙖𝙣𝙙-𝙛𝙧𝙞𝙨𝙠; 𝙖𝙣𝙙 (7) 𝙚𝙭𝙞𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙩 𝙖𝙣𝙙 𝙚𝙢𝙚𝙧𝙜𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙮 𝙘𝙞𝙧𝙘𝙪𝙢𝙨𝙩𝙖𝙣𝙘𝙚𝙨, none applies in this case.

Contrary to the CA's findings, the warrantless search on Angelito was not incidental to a lawful arrest. Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. Indeed, there must first be a lawful arrest before a warrantless search and seizure can be made. The process cannot be reversed.

Essentially, a lawful arrest must precede the warrantless search.Arrest is the taking of a person into custody so that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense." One of the instances when a person may be lawfully arrested without a warrant is the in flagrante delicto arrest— as when a person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. 𝙏𝙤 𝙗𝙚 𝙫𝙖𝙡𝙞𝙙, 𝙖𝙣 𝙞𝙣 𝙛𝙡𝙖𝙜𝙧𝙖𝙣𝙩𝙚 𝙙𝙚𝙡𝙞𝙘𝙩𝙤 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩 𝙢𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙥𝙡𝙮 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙛𝙤𝙡𝙡𝙤𝙬𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙧𝙚𝙦𝙪𝙞𝙨𝙞𝙩𝙚𝙨: (𝙖) 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙚𝙧𝙨𝙤𝙣 𝙩𝙤 𝙗𝙚 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙚𝙙 𝙢𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙚𝙭𝙚𝙘𝙪𝙩𝙚 𝙖𝙣 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙞𝙣𝙙𝙞𝙘𝙖𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙝𝙖𝙩 𝙝𝙚 𝙝𝙖𝙨 𝙟𝙪𝙨𝙩 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙙, 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙘𝙩𝙪𝙖𝙡𝙡𝙮 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜, 𝙤𝙧 𝙞𝙨 𝙖𝙩𝙩𝙚𝙢𝙥𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙩𝙤 𝙘𝙤𝙢𝙢𝙞𝙩 𝙖 𝙘𝙧𝙞𝙢𝙚; 𝙖𝙣𝙙 (𝙗) 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙤𝙫𝙚𝙧𝙩 𝙖𝙘𝙩 𝙞𝙨 𝙙𝙤𝙣𝙚 𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙥𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙚𝙣𝙘𝙚 𝙤𝙧 𝙬𝙞𝙩𝙝𝙞𝙣 𝙩𝙝𝙚 𝙖𝙧𝙧𝙚𝙨𝙩𝙞𝙣𝙜 𝙤𝙛𝙛𝙞𝙘𝙚𝙧'𝙨 𝙫𝙞𝙚𝙬.

The Supreme Court ruled that the warrantless search conducted on Ridon was invalid. The Court emphasized that a traffic violation, such as entering a one-way street, does not justify an arrest but merely warrants the confiscation of the driver's license. Since there was no valid arrest, the subsequent warrantless search was deemed unlawful, rendering the seized firearm inadmissible as evidence. With no admissible evidence remaining, the Court acquitted Ridon of the charges.

𝘋𝘪𝘨𝘦𝘴𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘣𝘺 𝘚𝘪𝘵𝘵𝘪𝘦 𝘍𝘢𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘩 𝘔. 𝘗𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘨, 4-𝘑𝘋, 𝘈.𝘠. 2024-2025, 𝘔𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘢𝘰 𝘚𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 𝘜𝘯𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘺 - 𝘊𝘰𝘭𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘦 𝘰𝘧 𝘓𝘢𝘸, 𝘐𝘭𝘪𝘨𝘢𝘯 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯.

The Supreme Court has established guidelines for when a confiscated firearm must be presented as evidence in court.
The Court acknowledged that in previous cases, it had stated that the actual firearm does not need to be presented as evidence.
To prevent confusion that could lead to the imposition of incorrect penalties or, even worse, the conviction of an innocent person, the Court established the following guidelines on when the confiscated firearm must be presented in court:
1. Where an accused is charged with violation of Republic Act No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Fi****ms and Ammunition Regulation Act, the exact same firearm confiscated must be presented in court to determine whether the accused should be convicted and the proper penalty to be imposed;
2. When the use of a firearm is a qualifying circumstance, i.e., when it changes the nature of the crime, and the penalty imposable depends on the classification of the firearm, the exact same firearm confiscated must be presented in court;
3. When the use of a firearm is an aggravating circumstance, i.e., when it increases the penalty to the maximum period imposable, or is inherent in or absorbed by the nature of the crime charged, the exact same firearm confiscated is preferred, but the presentation of secondary evidence may also be considered; and
4. In all situations where a firearm is confiscated from an accused, the confiscated firearm must be marked, photographed, and duly authenticated, and its integrity preserved.
The Court underscored that in cases involving violations of RA 10591, the absence of the actual confiscated firearm cannot be overlooked. It further emphasized that a mere certificate stating that the accused lacks a license to own or possess the firearm is not enough to secure a conviction.
The Decision was from the Supreme Court En Banc, written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, with a Separate Concurring Opinion from Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo and a Concurring Opinion from Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.
Read the full text of the press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-sets-guidelines-on.../
Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-benjamin-togado-y.../
Read the full text of the Separate Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-separate-concurring.../
Read the full text of the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-concurring-opinion.../

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

https://www.facebook.com/SupremeCourtPhilippines/posts/pfbid02QM22KM5uSR17QkcgsRk3WWfRUCmX6jGBru9xf6CYDnKeLcdpDBFQ3HFe64HWXWRNl?__cft__[0]=AZWuxLoXSHTfoSGDKE_bAtfWi7vDzPfIOdOn50YAdfw3V5fWqbGEMb8gDH6xwv8Rw1YRDBAxV1ixGO_xlohY9fdeuYIGMFYqR58fPhsmJQTHUWuDaczypmn8GCfMgpPPf4HV9pOskKwHMuPQ1Ns_Gz3XeOaviOfemy4mRjqe7Tq-XcTLHJ3X3YsLaNFfeeydv_yaC6Nztbo4ujc25ojneO4NEQ5OlrMqaFpoBA6rytBzTw&__tn__=-UK-R

The Supreme Court has established guidelines for when a confiscated firearm must be presented as evidence in court.

The Court acknowledged that in previous cases, it had stated that the actual firearm does not need to be presented as evidence.

To prevent confusion that could lead to the imposition of incorrect penalties or, even worse, the conviction of an innocent person, the Court established the following guidelines on when the confiscated firearm must be presented in court:

1. Where an accused is charged with violation of Republic Act No. 10591 or the Comprehensive Fi****ms and Ammunition Regulation Act, the exact same firearm confiscated must be presented in court to determine whether the accused should be convicted and the proper penalty to be imposed;

2. When the use of a firearm is a qualifying circumstance, i.e., when it changes the nature of the crime, and the penalty imposable depends on the classification of the firearm, the exact same firearm confiscated must be presented in court;

3. When the use of a firearm is an aggravating circumstance, i.e., when it increases the penalty to the maximum period imposable, or is inherent in or absorbed by the nature of the crime charged, the exact same firearm confiscated is preferred, but the presentation of secondary evidence may also be considered; and

4. In all situations where a firearm is confiscated from an accused, the confiscated firearm must be marked, photographed, and duly authenticated, and its integrity preserved.

The Court underscored that in cases involving violations of RA 10591, the absence of the actual confiscated firearm cannot be overlooked. It further emphasized that a mere certificate stating that the accused lacks a license to own or possess the firearm is not enough to secure a conviction.

The Decision was from the Supreme Court En Banc, written by Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, with a Separate Concurring Opinion from Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo and a Concurring Opinion from Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.

Read the full text of the press release: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-sets-guidelines-on-presenting-fi****ms-as-evidence-in-court/

Read the full text of the Decision: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-benjamin-togado-y-pailan-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

Read the full text of the Separate Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Gesmundo: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-separate-concurring-opinion-chief-justice-alexander-g-gesmundo/

Read the full text of the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260973-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/



Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

Below is the 2012 landmark case of SPO2 Nacnac vs People (GR. No. 191913), which changes our common knowledge of self-defense.

Before this case landmark case, it has been held that [u]nlawful aggression, as one of an indispensable elements of self-defense, requires an [a]ctual, [s]udden, and [u]nexpected attack, or [imminent danger] thereof, and [not merely] a threatening or intimidating attitude. Hence, under the common knowledge of self-defense, the act of (let say) E' of allegedly drawing a gun from his waist, (intimidating attitude), cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Because such act did [not] put in real peril the life or personal safety of another

In this case, said the court, "the facts surrounding the case must, however, be [d]ifferentiated from the current jurisprudence of unlawful aggression- the victim here was a trained police officer.

. . Then the Court went further and held, "it is worth emphasizing that the victim, being a policeman himself, is `presumed' to be quick in firing. Hence, it now becomes reasonably certain that in this specific case, it would have been 'fatal' for the appellant (accused) to have 'waited' for E' to point his gun before N' fires back.

Hence,. . . N' was only defending himself on the night he shot his fellow police officer. This court also sustained the reasonable means employed - single gun shot at the head of the police officer is reasonable under the circumstances. (Emphasis ours).

CTTO

"OLD BUT GOLD"

It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.

# # # # # #

However, for one who acts by virtue of any of the exempting circumstances, although he commits a crime, by the complete absence of any of the conditions which constitute free will or voluntariness of the act, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, while there is a crime committed, no criminal liability attaches. Thus, in Guevarra v. Almodovar, we held:

[I]t is worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, Albert has stated:

"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant (has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability."
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing a criminal act.

New hierarchy of probative value:

Substantive evidence
Clear and convincing evidence
Probable cause
Certainty of conviction
Preponderance of evidence
Proof beyond reasoble doubt
Screenshot ni Misis.

TOPIC: Three-fold responsibility rule.

The argument is untenable. The same wrongful act committed by the public officer can subject him to civil, administrative and criminal liabilities.

We held in Tecson v. Sandiganbayan: [I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is under a three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension, removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.

An opinion with legal basis.