27/02/2026
Address to the UNMISS Consultation
Meeting with Political Parties’ Leaders
By Joseph Modesto
Secretary General,
Communist Party of South Sudan
Juba 25 February 2026
TOPIC: UNMISS Consultation With Political Parties’ Leaders On The Proposed Peace
Dialogues Initiatives.
Honorable Mr. Graham Maitland, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General, (Political Affairs)
Fellow Political Leaders and Stakeholders!
The Communist Party of South Sudan (CPSS) extends its sincere appreciation to UNMISS for
this invitation to engage in the vital discourse surrounding political stabilization and the national political
transition.
The invitation from Mr. Graham Maitland arrives at a critical juncture: South Sudan is currently trying to
navigate a congested landscape of overlapping political initiatives, including the Broad-Based
Committee on Elections, the Tumaini Peace Initiative and the Pretoria Retreat.
We welcome this opportunity to address the important and essential question of how to ensure coherence and inclusive participation amidst these competing frameworks.
This engagement serves as a timely follow-up to the BRIDGE Training conducted in January
2026, which underscored global standards for inclusive, credible and democratic elections.
However, as we reflect on the guiding questions before us, we as political leaders must speak out with the clarity and urgency that the current crisis demands. Although we are leaders of the political parties we are not being consulted here as heads of political parties to present our own position as individuals, but we are here to present the official position of the political party each one of us leads.
I. Assessment of the Broad-Based Committee on Elections
Question: What is your assessment of the mandate of the Broad-Based Committee on Elections?
Does it represent an inclusive platform for political dialogue, and what support is required to
create an atmosphere for peaceful and credible elections?
CPSS Position: The “Broad-Based Committee"; is a misnomer. This naming suggests an
inclusivity that is fundamentally absent—a glaring error that we believe will lead to contested
and violent outcomes. While the government labels the committee as ”Broad-Based”; it is widely
criticized as an SPLM-IG-dominated body designed for a one-party monologue. It has
intentionally sidelined the mainstream SPLM-IO, led by Dr. Riek Machar, who is one of the two
principal signatories of the R-ARCSS. Consequently, it does not represent an inclusive platform for genuine political dialogue. In fact this dialogue committee was established in order to hijack the consensus call for by South Sudanese stakeholders and international partners for political dialogue.
To create an environment conducive to peaceful and credible elections, the following support and
changes are required:
• Universal Participation: The process must include all political parties, as protected
under Article 25 (1) of the Transitional Constitution (as amended), alongside non-
signatory groups and armed groups, but Civil society and faith-based organizations should be integrated as active observers.
• Dr. Riek Machar leader of SPLM-IO together with President Salva leader of SPLM-IG were initially the only parties IGAD organized in the Addis Ababa Peace Dialogue on conflict of South Sudan. It was later that the meeting of IGAD Heads of States resolved to include other seven (7) political parties to join the peace dialogue to give it a semblance of South Sudanese ownership. It is difficult to accept that Dr. Riek Machar, and the political party he leads, is intentionally excluded from the Broad-Based Peace Committee that was established by President Salva Kiir to be chaired by Hon. Dr. Paul Akol Kordit. Moreover the committee was unilaterally formed without consultation with Dr. Machar, one of the two principal signatories of the Revitalized Peace Agreement. It is to be noted the so-called SPLM-IO led by Dr. Stephen Pal, who claims to continue the role of Dr. Riek as acting leader of SPLM-IO is not true because since April 2025 Dr. Stephen was dismissed from SPLM-IO, hence that dismissal does not legitimize him as a member of SPLM-IO.
• Mandate and Legitimacy: A committee with a mere 45-day mandate cannot resolve
existential issues such as the national census and the permanent constitution.
• Furthermore, its formation violates the consensus-based decision-making required by the
R-ARCSS. As established in the BRIDGE training, inclusivity is the bedrock of legitimacy.
• National Dialogue Workshop: We require a continuous, standing forum to tackle the fundamental issues facing South Sudan.
• Oversight and Independence: The entire process must be conducted under the joint
auspices of the African Union (AU) and UNMISS as mediators, with guaranteed funding from the international community to ensure financial independence.
• Mediation process: mediators should not have vested interest in South Sudan’s economic policies not even in the outcomes of the dialogue.
• Implementation Matrix: this should be vigorous with well established framework for monitoring.
• Timelines: It is important that timelines need not to be short as a means to serve the interest of the incumbent power.
The Security Paradox:
The CPSS notes the bitter irony of discussing a “peaceful transition” while the country remains in the grip of what is effectively a return to war. Since late December 2025, renewed hostilities in Jonglei State have displaced between 180,000 and 280,000 people. Inflammatory rhetoric and military ultimatums from army commanders signal the total collapse of the 2018 ceasefire.
II. Regional Dialogue Efforts: Tumaini and the South Africa Retreat
Question: What outcomes could reasonably be expected from regional dialogue efforts, including
the Tumaini Peace Initiative and the proposed leadership retreat in South Africa?
CPSS Position: We view regional efforts with deep concern and caution. The Tumaini Initiative is currently faltering due to a lack of local ownership; it has been rejected by stakeholders who feel it imposes predetermined outcomes without sufficient consultation.
Regarding the C5 Plus Declaration (comprising the AU C5, IGAD, and UN leadership), we acknowledge its three main pillars:
1. The Ceasefire Mandate: The AU’s shift from “being concerned” to a ”demand” for an unconditional
cessation of hostilities is a direct admission that the 2018 Permanent Ceasefire has collapsed.
2. The Release of Dr. Riek Machar: By specifically calling for the release of the First Vice President by name, the AU is challenging the government’s attempt to use the judiciary to sideline the principal opposition leader.
3. The Election Ultimatum: The declaration sets December 2026 as a non-negotiable date for
elections. However, the CPSS maintains that “peaceful elections” in 2026 are a dangerous
fantasy unless the cycle of repeated extensions of broken roadmaps is ended.
The South Africa Leadership Retreat will only be effective if it facilitates a direct, face-to-face
dialogue between President Kiir and Dr. Machar to secure an immediate ceasefire and the release of political detainees.
III. Coordination and the Way to Forward
Question: How can these initiatives be coordinated to ensure complementarity? What other
options and solutions do the political parties propose?
CPSS Position:The R-ARCSS has exhausted its utility. We propose that the R-ARCSS be allowed to expire ceremonially, to be replaced by a Genuine Consensus-Based Political Transition.
Instead of technical roadmaps that ignore the fundamental restructuring of power, we propose a
transition led by technocrats, focusing on nation-building rather than partisan competition.
Tenets of the CPSS Proposal:
The Communist Party of South Sudan proposes the following framework for a stable transition:
1. Ceremonial Expiration of R-ARCSS: Acknowledge the end of the current failed transition to
make way for a new, consensus-based model.
2. Government of Technocrats: The establishment of a lean executive government composed of
non-partisan technocrats.
3. Prime Ministerial Leadership: The transition should be led by a Prime Minister with a clear,
time-bound mandate.
4. Three-Year Transitional Period: A three year window to allow for the cooling of political tensions and the reorganization of political parties at the grassroots level.
5. Core Mandates: The transitional government shall focus exclusively on:
• The conduct of a credible national census.
• The drafting and adoption of a Permanent Constitution.
• The resettlement and repatriation of refugees and IDPs.
• The eventual holding of general elections at the end of the three-year term.
6. Continuous Consensus Workshop: A standing political forum must remain in session until a
final national consensus is reached.
7. International Independent Funding: To ensure sovereignty and neutrality, the transition must
be funded by the UN, AU, and Troika, independent of the current administration’s control.