Family Court, Branch 17, Antipolo City

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s ( # # #2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in sexual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, # # #266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. # # #266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a sexual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, # # #266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and # # #266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other sexual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and # # #266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his sexual demands. Meanwhile, # # #266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified # # #266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the sexual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other sexual abuse as those who indulge in sexual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of sexual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to sexual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in sexual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, also apply to other sexual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse because she had sexual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to # # #266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to sexual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. # # #266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make # # #266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, # # #266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, # # #266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

The Judiciary adopts flexible work arrangements and energy conservation measures starting March 9, 2026 in Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 issued by Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.

In the Memo, the (SC) observes a four-day on-site and one-day work-from-home (WFH) work arrangement, citing Friday as the generally observed WFH day and provided that at least 25% of the employees in each office or division shall report on-site every Friday, as determined by the head of office or division, to ensure continuity of operations.

The Office of the Chief Justice, the Office of the Senior Associate Justice, the Offices of the Associate Justices, the Cash Collection and Disbursement Division of the Fiscal Management and Budget Office, the Docket-Receiving Section of the Judicial Records Office, the Management Information Systems Office (MISO) with respect to its essential staff, and the Office of the Judiciary Marshals are excluded from this work arrangement, and shall maintain the regular work arrangements.

The Court of Appeals (CA) shall observe the same work arrangements prescribed for the SC, provided that on Fridays, at least 25% of the employees in each office or division shall report on-site, and, at least, three Justices comprising one division, on a rotation basis, shall be available to act on urgent matters, including petitions for extraordinary writs and petitions and motions in connection with Republic Act No. 9160, or the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended.

Meanwhile, the Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals shall continue to observe a full five-day on-site workweek, without special work arrangement.

The First- and Second- Level Courts shall likewise observe a four-day on-site and one-day WFH arrangement.

In single-sala courts, Presiding Judges may adopt either of the following on-site work schedules: (1) on-site work from Monday to Thursday, with Friday designated as the WFH day, or (2) on-site work from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday designated as the WFH day; Provided that pairing courts shall not be on WFH schedule on the same day.

In multiple-sala courts, the four-day on-site and one-day WFH arrangement shall be implemented alternately. Within the same week, odd-numbered branches shall initially report on-site from Monday to Thursday, with Friday designated as the WFH day, while even-numbered branches shall report on-site from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday designated as the WFH day. In the following week, the schedules shall be reversed (i.e., the odd-numbered branches shall report on-site from Tuesday to Friday, with Monday as the WFH day, while the even-numbered branches shall report on-site from Monday to Thursday, with Friday as the WFH day.) This alternating schedule shall continue every week until the four-day workweek arrangement is lifted.

The flexible work arrangements prescribed in Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 shall commence on March 9, 2026, and shall remain in force until modified or lifted by the SC.

Read the full text of Memorandum Circular No. 02 - 2026 at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=161689

NOTICE OF VACANCY

1.) 1 DATA ENTRY MACHINE OPERATOR II - SG 8
✅Completion of two years in college/High School graduate/completion of Grade 12/completion of Grade 10
✅with relevant vocational trade course (TESDA NCII)
✅One year of relevant experience
✅Four (4) hours relevant training
✅Civil Service eligibility -Sub-pro

2.) 1 PSYCHOLOGIST II - SG 18
✅Master's Degree in Psychology
✅One year of relevant experience involving the delivery of psychological services
✅Eight hours relevant training
✅Eligibility - RA10029

Kindly submit your application/s with complete requirements to the Honorable Presiding Judge through the Branch Clerk of Court.

Hon. Anna Zita Abuda-Caballegan
Presiding Judge

Atty. Francis Arce
Branch Clerk of Court

email:
[email protected]

The has approved the Proposed Amendments to the Guidelines on the Conduct of Videoconferencing.

The Guidelines shall take effect on February 16, 2026, 15 days following its posting on the Supreme Court and OCA websites.

The Guidelines expand the definition of “overseas venues,” which now covers “Philippine consulates and embassies, other Philippine government offices abroad, other places allowed under applicable bilateral or multilateral agreements, and any other venue authorized by the Supreme Court for videoconferencing from abroad.” [Section 2(j), Part 1]

Section 4, Part 2 of the Guidelines details how videoconferencing is initiated:

“In civil and criminal cases, the parties, through their counsel, individually or jointly, may, by written or oral motion, move that they be allowed to participate via videoconferencing.

“In criminal cases, a motion to participate via videoconferencing shall be accompanied by a waiver of the right of the accused to meet witnesses face to face when the videoconferencing specifically involves the confrontation of a witness.

“Videoconferencing shall be the preferred mode in cases involving PDLs and CICL at all stages of the proceedings.

“It shall also be the preferred mode for arraignment, bail hearings, and hearings involving minor incidents of other accused, such as, but not limited to, clarificatory hearings, compliance hearings, and other similar ancillary matters where the presence of the accused is not necessary, unless the court deems it appropriate for the accused to appear in person.

“For a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of cases, the court may, on its own instance, order that the proceedings be conducted through videoconferencing at any or all stages”

Copies of the Guidelines are available at:

Supreme Court website:https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

Office of the Court Administrator website:https://oca.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/A.M-No.-24-11-02-SC_FINAL.pdf

The 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has suspended the sentence of a child in conflict with the law (CICL), reaffirming the intent of Republic Act No. 9344, or the 𝘑𝘶𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘪𝘭𝘦 𝘑𝘶𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘦 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘞𝘦𝘭𝘧𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘈𝘤𝘵, to promote the best interests and rehabilitation of the child.

In a Decision written by then Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 denied the appeal of # # #265302 (accused) and found him guilty of qualified r**e of a minor, imposing a penalty of 12 years to 14 years, eight months and one day in prison.

It remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to order the accused's confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility under Section 51 of the law.

The accused, who was 15 years old at the time of the incident, was charged with ra**ng his five-year-old playmate.

The RTC found # # #265302 guilty of statutory r**e after he turned 18 years old. It imposed on him the penalty of imprisonment for eight years and one day to 14 years, eight months and one day, but it suspended his sentence, following Section 38 of RA 9344.

A few months later, the RTC issued an arrest warrant, and # # #265302 was detained at the New Bilibid Prison. The Court of Appeals denied his appeal.

The SC affirmed # # #265302’s conviction but clarified that the crime was qualified r**e and ordered the suspension of his sentence.

Section 40 of RA 9344 provides that when the CICL reaches 18 while under suspended sentence, the court may discharge them, order the ex*****on of their sentence, or extend the suspended sentence for a period or until they reach the maximum age of 21 years old.

In this case, the accused, who was transferred to the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, is now 25 years old.

Nonetheless, the SC extended the suspension of his sentence to fulfill the law’s legislative intent, which prioritizes the child offender’s restoration, rehabilitation, and reintegration into the community.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159175.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159085.

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PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION NOT INDISPENSABLE IN PROVING PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS GROUND FOR MARRIAGE NULLITY—SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that a psychiatric report or evaluation is not the key evidence in proving psychological incapacity, stressing that what must be proven through the totality of evidence is an enduring personality trait that renders a spouse incapable of performing essential marital obligations.

In a 16-page decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, the SC's Second Division granted the petition of Milagrosa Villarey Kusk to nullify her marriage to her Danish husband, Torben Kusk, on the ground of their psychological incapacities.

Their love story started when they met in 1992. Torben later on expressed his intention to marry Milagrosa and vowed that he would provide her with a good life. Milagrosa, then 31 years old and with a child from another man, was enticed by Torben's promise and agreed to go with him to Denmark.

Subsequently, Milagrosa was granted a Danish visa, which allowed her to fly to Denmark and start living with Torben. In November 1992, they got married. A day after their wedding, Torben punched Milagrosa in the face while he was drunk. It was the first time Torben hit her, but he apologized the day after.

In 1993, Milagrosa and Torben migrated to the Philippines and started a small business. Over the next two years, Torben acquainted himself with new individuals and became more familiar with the local environment. He also began frequenting bars and typically returned home between 3 and 5 a.m.

In April 1995, Torben arrived drunk at their home at 3 a.m. and slapped Milagrosa on the face, which she later reported to the Women's Desk of the Philippine National Police. After learning of the complaint filed against him by Milagrosa, Torben left her and never returned to their home.

Almost 10 years after Torben left her, Milagrosa attempted to look for him by going to the Danish Embassy, but she failed to get any information.

In 2007, she found out that Torben was still in the Philippines and living with different women. This paved the way for her to file a petition for nullification of their marriage.

Milagrosa presented a psychologist's report, which found that Torben was suffering from passive aggressive personality disorder with underlying antisocial personality disorder. Meanwhile, she was likewise diagnosed to be suffering from narcissistic personality disorder.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied Milagrosa's petition, which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled that while Torben's violence may be considered as abnormal behavior, this, in itself, is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

The CA likewise stressed Milagrosa failed to show the link between the acts of psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder, which should have existed before they were married. This prompted her to elevate the case before the Supreme Court. The SC released a resolution directing Torben to file a comment but received no reply.

In declaring the marriage of Milagrosa and Torben as void from the beginning, the high court noted that Milagrosa was able to sufficiently prove that both of them were psychologically incapacitated to fulfill their essential marital obligations.

It explained that their psychological incapacities are apparent in their inability to communicate effectively and resolve their conflicts to maintain a stable relationship, which was bolstered by expert testimony that confirmed the presence of deep-seated psychological issues.

The highest bench also highlighted that psychological or medical examination of a spouse is not required as a condition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, as psychological incapacity should be viewed in the legal and not medical perspective, which should be determined through all the evidence presented.

"The evidence presented by Milagrosa convincingly demonstrates that both she and Torben were psychologically incapable of fulfilling their essential marital obligations. Both parties were unable to comply with the basic marital covenants, such as the mutual obligation to live together, observe love, respect, and fidelity, and render help and support to each other," the Supreme Court said.

The has laid down guideposts for proving who owns or controls a social media account in criminal cases.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed the conviction of an individual ( # # #) for committing psychological violence under Section 5 (i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊) 𝘈𝘤𝘵 against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬.

The SC sentenced # # # to up to eight years in prison, imposed a PHP 100,000 fine, and ordered # # # to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

The SC stressed that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender.

It explained that for crimes committed through social media, the basic features of the platform such as 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬, must be considered.

Noting that 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 is widely used in the Philippines, the SC held that a 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 account can easily be created by anyone claiming to be at least 13 years old with an email address or mobile number.

Once an account is created, the user can add friends, exchange private messages, and post statements, photos, or videos visible to others depending on the user’s privacy settings. Fake or dummy accounts can easily spread, enabling disinformation, identity theft, or crimes.

Given this, the SC ruled that guideposts are necessary to establish who owns or controls a social media account. It said the following must be shown to prove ownership or access:

1. Admission of ownership or authorship;
2. Being seen accessing the account or composing the post;
3. Containing information known only to the offender or a few people;
4. Language consistent with the offender’s characteristics;
5. Records from the internet service provider, telecommunications company, or social media site, and results from device forensic analysis showing geolocation features, and other attributes linking the account to the offender;
6. Acts consistent with previous posts; or
7. Other instances showing ownership, access, or authorship.

Applying these, the SC found that several factors proved # # # wrote the 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 post. The account name bore his full name, and the profile photo showed him with his child from his current live-in partner.

AAA’s sister had also received messages from the same account for years.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158535.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=158446.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

HALF-DAY WORK SUSPENSION ON 23 DECEMBER 2025

Work suspension on 29 December 2025 and 02 January 2026