DAMC Law Office

05/10/2026

The has ruled that waiving rights to inherited property may be considered a valid donation when it shows intent to donate and meets the legal requirements for a donation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division denied the consolidated petitions filed by Felix G. Cruz and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) rulings upholding the transfer of two inherited properties by Luis and Rosita Cruz to their sons, Robin and Osias.

The case involved two parcels of land left by Judy Cruz, who died single and without a will. She was survived by her parents, Luis and Rosita, and five siblings, including Felix, Robin, and Osias.

After Judy’s death, Luis and Rosita executed separate notarized 𝘞𝘢𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴 over the properties in favor of Robin and Osias, who later executed an 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘚𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘌𝘴𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘦 and registered the properties in their names.

Felix and his two other siblings, Doris and Henry, also executed waivers giving up any interest in the properties. Felix, who was the family lawyer, prepared these documents.

After their mother died, Felix sought to nullify the transfer of the properties and cancel the titles of Robin and Osias. Felix argued that the transfer was invalid and that the properties should have remained part of their mother’s estate, to which he was entitled to inherit as one of the heirs.

The SC upheld the ruling of the trial court and the CA dismissing Felix’s complaint and holding that the Waivers of Rights executed by Luis and Rosita constituted valid donations in favor of Robin and Osias.

The SC explained that when Judy died, ownership of her properties immediately passed to her parents as her legal heirs. Luis and Rosita therefore had the right to dispose of the properties.

Although the documents they executed were called 𝘞𝘢𝘪𝘷𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘪𝘨𝘩𝘵𝘴, the SC found that Luis and Rosita intended to donate the properties to Robin and Osias.

Under Article 749 of the 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, a valid donation of real property requires: (1) a decrease in the donor’s property; (2) a corresponding increase in the donee’s property; (3) intent to donate; (4) ex*****on of the donation in a public document; and (5) acceptance by the donee. If the acceptance is in a separate document, the donor must be informed.

These requirements were met in this case. Luis and Rosita gave up their ownership of the properties in favor of Robin and Osias through notarized documents that expressly authorized the transfer. Robin and Osias, in turn, accepted the donation by executing the 𝘌𝘹𝘵𝘳𝘢𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘚𝘦𝘵𝘵𝘭𝘦𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 and registering the properties in their names. Their actions were made known to Luis and Rosita.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174097.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168026.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

05/10/2026

The has voided a couple’s marriage after finding that they falsely claimed five years of cohabitation to avoid obtaining a marriage license.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC’s Third Division denied the petition of the Republic of the Philippines which sought to declare a couple’s marriage valid despite the absence of a marriage license.

The couple had lived together as husband and wife since December 2003. In 2006, the husband left for Israel to work and returned in 2009 to marry his wife. To facilitate their marriage without the required license, the couple executed an 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, claiming they had lived together for six years and were thus exempt from the marriage license requirement under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

In 2013, the husband filed a petition to declare the marriage void, arguing the 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 they executed was false because he was in Israel for most of the period it covered.

The SC explained that while Article 3(2) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 provides that one of the formal requisites of a marriage is a valid marriage license, Article 34 of the same provides an exception to this requirement for couples who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and have no legal impediment to marry each other.

Citing the 2000 case of 𝘕𝘪ñ𝘢𝘭 𝘷. 𝘉𝘢𝘺𝘢𝘥𝘰𝘨, the SC stressed that the five-year cohabitation period is counted back from the marriage date. The couple must have lived together continuously and exclusively, without interruption or a third party.

In this case, the SC said that the testimony of the husband showed the couple had not lived together continuously for five years, making their 𝘈𝘧𝘧𝘪𝘥𝘢𝘷𝘪𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘰𝘩𝘢𝘣𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 to the solemnizing officer false. His testimony also supported the finding that they failed to meet the five-year requirement.

The SC found that from 2001 to 2004, before the husband left for Israel, they lived separately and only occasionally shared a rented room with relatives. From 2005 to 2009, while the husband was in Israel, there was no evidence that they presented themselves as spouses or that he intended to return to the Philippines to live with his wife.

The SC thus ruled that there was not enough evidence to prove that the couple continuously and exclusively cohabited as husband and wife for a period of five years immediately preceding the celebration of their marriage.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=174170.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168047.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

27/08/2026

The (SC) has clarified the rules on serving notices of dishonor in cases involving Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘉𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘤𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘊𝘩𝘦𝘤𝘬 𝘓𝘢𝘸. The SC formally recognized electronic service as a valid mode of serving notice of dishonor, while requiring safeguards to ensure that service can be reliably proven in court.

In a Decision penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 affirmed the conviction of spouses Arnel and Marivic Carlos for six counts of violating BP 22.

The spouses issued six checks to respondent Tire Star, Inc. as payment for car tires. All six checks were dishonored by the bank as the account they were drawn from had been closed.

The prosecution presented evidence that Tire Star’s messenger personally attempted to serve the notice of dishonor at the spouses’ office, and that the spouses refused to receive it, instructed an employee instead to sign for it.

The spouses then claimed before the SC that they should be acquitted because they were not properly served with a notice of dishonor.

The SC rejected the spouses’ argument, emphasizing that an accused cannot defeat a BP 22 prosecution simply by denying receipt of the notice or refusing to accept it. Otherwise, issuers could easily evade liability by avoiding service.

To promote uniformity and reduce disputes, the SC clarified the acceptable modes of serving notices of dishonor.

𝗣𝗲𝗿𝘀𝗼𝗻𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲 remains the preferred mode. The notice may be delivered directly to the issuer or, in the case of a business, to an authorized representative. If the issuer cannot be served at the office, the notice may be left at the issuer’s residence with an adult resident between 8:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M.

The person serving the notice must execute an affidavit stating when, where, and how service was made. When practicable, service should be documented through photographs or video recordings, subject to proper authentication in court.

If personal service is not practicable, the notice of dishonor may be sent by 𝗿𝗲𝗴𝗶𝘀𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗲𝗱 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹, or where registry service is unavailable, by 𝗼𝗿𝗱𝗶𝗻𝗮𝗿𝘆 𝗺𝗮𝗶𝗹. The person serving the notice must likewise execute an affidavit explaining why personal service could not be made and attach the supporting postal documents.

The SC also recognized 𝗲𝗹𝗲𝗰𝘁𝗿𝗼𝗻𝗶𝗰 𝘀𝗲𝗿𝘃𝗶𝗰𝗲, ruling that a notice of dishonor may now be served through email as a primary mode of service when the issuer previously provided their email address. Electronic service may likewise be used through platforms such as 𝘝𝘪𝘣𝘦𝘳, 𝘍𝘢𝘤𝘦𝘣𝘰𝘰𝘬 𝘔𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳, or similar applications, provided it can be verified that the electronic account belongs to the issuer.

Electronic service may also be used when the issuer refuses to receive the notice, avoids service, or when personal service is otherwise impracticable. In such cases, the electronic notice must be sent within 24 hours after the final unsuccessful attempt at personal service and must state the dates and details of those failed attempts.

The sender must also execute an affidavit and preserve supporting evidence, such as screenshots, messages, delivery or read receipts, or chat histories., stressing that a simple denial of receipt is not enough to invalidate electronic service.

In all instances, to successfully dispute service, the issuer must show that it was physically impossible to have received the notice at the time and place it was served.

The spouses were fined a total of PHP 609,972.58 for the six BP 22 violations, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of nonpayment. They were also ordered to pay Tire Star the same amount, plus interest.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen agreed that electronic service should not merely be a substitute but a primary mode of service consistent with contemporary means of communication and the Judiciary’s ongoing digital reforms.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=172159.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171528.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171527.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

19/08/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a sales agent’s promise to issue a Contract to Sell after payment of reservation fee is not an “advertisement” under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 957, or the 𝘚𝘶𝘣𝘥𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘰𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘪𝘶𝘮 𝘉𝘶𝘺𝘦𝘳𝘴’ 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘦 𝘋𝘦𝘤𝘳𝘦𝘦, that would form part of developer’s warranties. However, the developer may still be required to refund a buyer if it fails to honor that promise.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ordered Empire East Land Holdings, Inc. (Empire East) to refund the payments made by John Edrem Bautista (Bautista) after it failed to issue the promised Contract to Sell.

Bautista paid Empire East for a residential unit PHP 130,000, consisting of a PHP 20,000 reservation fee and PHP 110,000 in additional payments. He claimed he made the payments because Empire East’s sales agent promised to issue a Contract to Sell once he paid the reservation fee. When more than a year passed without the contract being issued, Bautista stopped making payments and demanded a refund.

The SC, agreeing with both the Human Settlements Adjudication Commission (HSAC) and the Court of Appeals which ruled in Bautista’s favor, held that Bautista was entitled to a refund but clarified that the sales agent’s promise did not fall under Section 19 of PD 957.

The SC clarified that Section 19, which mandates truthful and non-misleading advertisements and sales materials, applies only to materials intended for the general public, such as those in those in newspapers, radio, TV, or similar mass communication channels. It does not cover promises made by a sales agent to individual buyers.

The SC emphasized that buyers remain protected, as developers may still be held liable under their contractual obligations and other applicable laws.

The SC ordered Empire East to refund Bautista the PHP 130,000 with interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the complaint in 2012, as well as to pay PHP 260,000 in exemplary damages, which courts award to discourage wrongful conduct and warn against similar actions.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=171359.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/272556-1.pdf.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.

07/08/2026

24/07/2026

Nagpasya ang na nananatiling may bisa ang bentahan ng lupa na magkaibang numero ng lote ang nakasaad sa kasulatan ng bentahan o deed of sale kumpara sa tunay na nabenta, basta’t malinaw na maipapakita ang totoong pinagkasunduan ng mga partido. Dahil dito, maaaring itama ang kasulatan para tumugma sa aktuwal na napagkasunduan ng magkabilang panig.

Sa Desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, pinagtibay ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang bentahan ng isang 491 metro kuwadradong lupain sa Lungsod ng Cebu sa pagitan ng mga mamimiling sina Genara at Felipe Abay, Sr. (mga Abay) at ng mga nagbentang sina Crispin Caballes at mga tagapagmana ni Trinidad Caballes-Gallardo (mga Gallardo), sa kabila ng pagkakamali sa nakalagay na numero ng lote sa deed of sale.

Bahagi ang lupang ito ng ari-ariang naiwan ni Margarita Lopez na may siyam na anak, kabilang sina Crispin at Trinidad.

Binisita ng mga Abay ang lugar kasama si Crispin at si Tomas Gallardo, isa sa mga tagapagmana ni Trinidad, bago nila binili ang ari-arian. Sa kanilang pagbisita, ipinakita sa kanila ang mga hangganan ng lupa. Tumulong pa si Tomas sa mga Abay sa pagtatayo ng bakod sa paligid nito.

Tinirahan ng mga Abay ang ari-arian nang humigit-kumulang 20 taon. Naputol lang ang kanilang paninirahan nang pumasok dito ang mga manggagawa ng mag-asawang Jacinto at Chiok Ngo Lim Young (mga Young), sinara ang bakod, at nagtayo ng sarili nilang mga poste.

Nalaman ng mga Abay na isang titulo para sa ari-arian ang naisyu sa pangalan ng mga Young. Dahil dito, naghain sila ng reklamo sa Regional Trial Court (RTC) para maipakansela ang nasabing titulo.

Kinuwestiyon ito ng mga Gallardo at ikinatuwirang ang mga dokumentong iprinisenta ng mga Abay ay tumutukoy sa ibang lote, ang Lot No. 6036-B, at hindi sa loteng kanilang tinitirhan na Lot No. 7. Bagama’t parehong matatagpuan sa iisang lugar ang dalawang lote, hiwalay na ari-arian ang mga ito at hindi magkatabi. Sinuportahan ng mga Young ang panig ng mga Gallardo at pinanindigang sila ay mga mamimili na may mabuting intensyon.

Nagdesisyon ang RTC pabor sa mga Abay, pero binaliktad ang desisyong ng Court of Appeals (CA). Ayon sa CA, ang mga dokumentong iprinisenta ng mga Abay ay nagpapakitang Lot No. 6036-B ang kanilang nabili at hindi ang Lot No. 7 na inangkin at pinaghahawakan nila.

Hindi sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema at iginiit nito ang ang mga naging desisyon nito sa mga naunang kaso na nagpapatibay ng bilihan. Pinahihintulutan nito ang pagtatama ng kasulatan para maipakita ang tunay na kasunduan ng mga panig sa mga pagkakataong nabigo ang deed of sale na tumpak na mailarawan ang lupang nilayon ng magkabilang panig.

Sa ilalim ng Civil Code, maaaring itama ang isang kasulatan nang kapag dahil sa isang pagkakamali hindi nito naipapakita ang tunay na pinagkasunduan ng mga panig.

Paliwanag ng Korte Suprema, ang isang kontrata ay maaaring baguhin o itama kung: (1) nagkasundo ang mga panig sa transaksyon; (2) hindi naipapahayag ng kasulatan ang kanilang tunay na kasunduan; at (3) ang kamalian ay sanhi ng pagkakamali o mistake, panlilinlang o fraud, aksidente, o unfair conduct.

Sa kasong ito, napatunayang umiiral ang lahat ng mga kondisyong ito.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=169523

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164169

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

16/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012.

In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual (###) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook.

The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial.

AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner ### after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public.

During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for ### the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was ###’s and that they received messages from him through the same account.

Despite ###’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting ###, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Resolving ###’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that ###’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision:

𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩;
𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭;
𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞;
𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬;
𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫;
𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫
𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩.

The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm.

Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices.

In this case, the Information alleged that ### made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed ### that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system.

The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial.

Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

09/07/2026

SC LAYS DOWN RULES ON PROVING OWNERSHIP OF SOCIAL MEDIA ACCOUNTS IN CRIMINAL CASES

The Supreme Court (SC) has laid down important guidelines on how courts should determine the identity of the person behind a social media account in criminal prosecutions, recognizing that online platforms have become common tools for committing crimes and that fake or dummy accounts are increasingly being used to conceal the identity of offenders.

The SC explained that ownership, control, or authorship of a social media account may be established through the following circumstances: (a) an admission by the accused that the account or post belongs to them; (b) evidence that the accused was seen accessing the account or composing the post; (c) information contained in the account or post that only the accused or a limited group of persons would likely know; (d) language, vocabulary, grammar, writing style, or other characteristics consistent with those of the accused; (e) records from internet service providers, telecommunications companies, or social media platforms, as well as forensic examination of electronic devices showing geolocation, account activity, or other identifying information; (f) acts or conduct consistent with the account's previous posts or activities; and (g) any other surrounding circumstances establishing ownership, access, or authorship. The Court emphasized that no single circumstance is conclusive, and that identity may be established through the totality of the evidence presented.

Read the full text in the comments.

03/07/2026

The (SC) has ruled that a husband and wife’s mutual desire to end their marriage, by itself, is not enough to prove collusion in a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. A lack of objection is not the same as collusion.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh, the SC’s Third Division ruled that there was no collusion between the spouses in a petition to declare their marriage void. “Collusion” means that the spouses secretly agreed to fake or misrepresent facts in order to nullify their marriage.

The SC voided the marriage due to the husband’s psychological incapacity.

The wife filed the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) alleging that her husband was unable to fulfill his marital duties because of continued physical, psychological, and economic abuse, which she said began even before their marriage.

When the husband did not file his answer to the petition, the RTC directed the Provincial Prosecutor to investigate possible collusion between the spouses. The Associate Provincial Prosecutor reported that there was no collusion.

During trial, the wife presented several witnesses while the husband presented none. He also did not oppose the petition.

Despite this, the RTC dismissed the case, ruling that the evidence did not sufficiently prove psychological incapacity.

The RTC pointed out that the husband’s father admitted discussing his testimony with his son, and that the husband was willing to have the marriage dissolved.

Explaining that collusion is a secret agreement to defraud or obtain something illegal, the SC noted that although the RTC observed suspicious circumstances, these did not clearly prove that the spouses conspired to fake grounds to nullify their marriage.

The SC emphasized that a mutual desire to end the marriage does not automatically mean collusion. A spouse’s agreement or lack of objection is not the same as a secret scheme to mislead the court.

Without proof that the spouses faked evidence or suppressed valid defenses, collusion cannot be established.

It added that the husband’s failure to file an answer or present evidence does not, by itself, prove collusion.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168319.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=165664.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attributionon-policy.