Atty. Rovelyn Paraan

The (SC) has ruled that a spouse’s acts creating a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse, their children, and common children may constitute “grossly abusive conduct” under the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 which serves as a ground for legal separation.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division granted the petition for legal separation filed by a husband against his wife, after finding that her actions constituted grossly abusive conduct under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦.

The couple married in 2003 and later had two children. To support their family, the wife started selling coffee, but they still faced financial hardships. The husband studied nursing with hopes of eventually relocating their family abroad. However, his plan to move abroad never materialized.

During the marriage, the husband claimed he faced various abusive behaviors from his wife. He reported that she controlled their finances and refused to provide financial help, even when he needed treatment for his toothache and was advised to get a root canal.

The husband also claimed that at a party, his wife told their friends she wanted to cut off his p***s because they were no longer having s*x. He also alleged that she shared stories about him with family and friends, often twisting the facts to make him look bad.

The husband also said that his wife refused marriage counseling, prohibited him from seeing his friends, manipulated their children to force him to provide more financial support, and maintained a controlling attitude throughout their marriage.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition for legal separation after finding that the wife’s behavior amounted to grossly abusive conduct. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling, holding that their disagreements were ordinary marital disputes.

The SC affirmed the RTC defining acts constituting “grossly abusive conduct”, which is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, to include those acts by a spouse that create a hostile and intimidating environment for the other spouse or the children.

The SC also stressed that courts must decide this issue on a case-by-case basis, based on the facts and evidence presented.

While the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 does not allow absolute divorce, spouses may legally separate by order of a court without ending their marriage. Unlike a declaration that a marriage is void, a legal separation does not break the marital bond.

Among the grounds for legal separation under Article 55(1) of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 is repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct against the spouse, their common child, or the spouse’s child.

The SC added that this interpretation is consistent with the State’s constitutional duty to protect marriage as a basic social institution.

In this case, the SC found that the wife’s actions, taken together, created a hostile and intimidating environment for the husband. He was made to constantly follow her lead, and his efforts to fix the marriage through counseling and other interventions were unsuccessful. Witnesses also confirmed her controlling behavior, which supported the finding of a hostile home environment. Because of this, the SC ruled that the husband was justified in seeking reassignment to another province to distance himself from the situation at home.

The SC granted the legal separation and sent the case back to the RTC for the dissolution and division of the couple’s property. It also directed the RTC to decide on the custody and support of their children.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166927

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164913

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164917

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy.

Nagpasya ang na ang mga pananakot na di-berbal (non-verbal threatening gestures) ay maaaring ituring na grave threats sa ilalim ng Revised Penal Code (RPC) kung malinaw na may criminal intent o layuning gumawa ng krimen.

Sa desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, pinawalang-sala ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte si Gregory Israel sa kasong grave threats matapos mapag-alamang wala siyang layuning gumawa ng krimen sa kanyang pagkukunwaring babarilin at pupugutan ng ulo ang dalawang indibidwal.

Gayunman, nilinaw ng Korte na maaaring maisagawa ang krimeng grave threats sa pamamagitan ng di-berbal na kilos, at hindi lamang sa pamamagitan ng pasalita o nakasulat na pananakot.

Si Israel na nagpakilala bilang Belgian architect na pinahintulutang magsanay ng kanyang propesyon sa Pilipinas, ay kinuha ng mga Belgian business partner na sina Christine Helena Amanda Navez at Olivier Edmund Denonville para sa pagpapatayo ng kanilang gusali. Matapos tumanggi si Israel na ayusin ang mga depekto sa nasabing gusali, nagpasya ang mag-business partner na sina Navez at Denonville na ihabla siya para masingil sa danyos.

Bandang 2017, habang pauwi mula sa paliparan sina Navez at Denonville, ay muntik nilang makabanggaan ang motorsiklo ni Israel. Kalaunan, sinasabing gumawa si Israel ng dalawang malinaw na kilos ng pananakot: itinutok ang kanyang mga daliri sa ulo ni Navez na parang nagpapaputok ng baril, at iginalaw ang mga daliri sa kanyang leeg na tila nagbabanta ng pagpupugot sa kanyang ulo.

Nahatulan si Israel ng grave threats. Nang pagtibayin ng Court of Appeals ang kanyang hatol, umapela siya sa Korte Suprema at iginiit na wala siyang layuning kriminal nang gawin niya ang mga kilos, at hindi saklaw ng Article 282 ng Revised Penal Code (RPC) ang mga kilos na di-berbal (pure non-verbal gestures).

Pinawalang-sala ng Korte si Israel dahil hindi napatunayan ang layuning kriminal. Gayunman, hindi ito sumang-ayon sa kanyang isa pang argumento, at iginiit na ang mga di-berbal na kilos ay maaari ring ituring na grave threats.

Para maparusahan ang isang tao sa kasong grave threats, dalawang elemento ang hinihingi ng RPC: ang aktwal na pagbigkas o pagpapahayag ng banta, at ang layuning manakot o magdulot ng takot.

Pinagtibay ng Korte na ang Article 282 ng RPC ay hindi nagtatangi sa mga banta na ipinapahayag sa salita at sa mga ipinapakita sa pamamagitan ng di-berbal na mga kilos. Ang mahalaga ay ang paghahatid ng banta na may layuning manakot.

Bagaman binabanggit sa ikalawang talata ng probisyon na ang mga banta ay maaaring ihatid nang pasalita o sa pamamagitan ng sulat, hindi nito isinasantabi ang mga banta na ipinapahayag sa pamamagitan ng di-berbal na mga paraan. Kaya, ang mga banta ay maaaring berbal o di-berbal.

Basahin ang buong press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/sc-non-verbal-gestures-may-be-considered-grave-threats-under-rpc/

Basahin ang buong Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/265736-gregory-israel-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

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Pinawalang-sala ng ang isang lalaking nahaharap sa kasong violence against women and their children o VAWC dahil sa pagtanggi umano nitong magbigay ng suportang pinansiyal sa isang batang hindi napatunayang sa kanya. Iginiit nito na nagkakaroon lang ng legal na tungkulin na magbigay ng suportang pinansiyal matapos mapatunayan ang filiation o paternity o ugnayan ng isang anak sa kanyang ama.

Sa desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, binaliktad ng Ikatlong Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang mga hatol ng Regional Trial Court at Court of Appeals na unang nagdeklarang guilty ang akusado sa kasalanang economic abuse sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. 9262 o ang Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act).

Nagsampa ng reklamo ang isang babae laban sa kanyang dating kasintahan na inakusahan niyang tumatangging magbigay ng suportang pinansiyal para sa kanyang anak.

Patuloy na itinanggi ng akusado na siya ang ama sa katwirang ipinanganak ang bata walong buwan matapos ang huli nilang pagtatalik.

Sa paglilitis, iprinisinta ng babae ang birth certificate ng bata bilang ebidensya. Gayunpaman, ang bahaging nagsasaad ng pangalan ng ama ay minarkahan ng “N/A” at hindi nilagdaan. Inamin din ng babae na tumanggi ang akusado na magbigay ng suportang pinansiyal dahil nag-aalinlangan ito kung siya nga ang ama ng bata.

Sa pagbaliktad ng hatol sa akusado, ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na para mahatulan ang isang tao sa kasalanang economic abuse sa ilalim ng Section 5(i) ng Anti-VAWC Act, dapat mapatunayan ng prosekusyon na: (1) ang biktima ay isang babae at/o kanyang anak; (2) ang babae ay asawa o kapareha ng akusado, o kaya ay isang taong may anak sa akusado; (3) tumanggi ang akusado na magbigay ng kailangang suportang pinansiyal; at (4) ang pagtanggi ay may layuning magdulot ng paghihirap sa isip o emosyon.

Sa kasong ito, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na nabigo ang prosekusyon na patunayan ang dalawang mahahalagang elemento: na may anak ang akusado at ang babae, at ginawa para magdulot ng pinsalang sikolohikal ang pagtanggi sa pagbibigay ng suporta.

Dahil hindi napatunayan ang paternity ng akusado sa kasong ito, walang legal na obligasyon na magbigay ng suporta ang maaaring ipataw sa kanya.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

Sa sesyon nito ngayong araw, ika-29 ng Abril 2026, isinantabi ng ang petition for mandamus na inihain ni Catalino Aldea Generillo, Jr. (Generillo). Nilalayon ng petisyon na pilitin ang Senado na agarang magpulong bilang isang impeachment court para litisin ang mga sakdal laban kay Bise Presidente Sara Duterte.

Sa Desisyong 14-0-1 na isinulat ni Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda, sinabi ng Korte Suprema na hindi tamang remedyo ang mandamus na naglalayong magpatupad ng isang malinaw na legal na tungkulin. Nagpasya ang Korte na hindi maaaring baguhin o kontrolin ng Hudikatura sa pamamagitan ng mandamus ang mga aksiyon ng Senado sa loob ng sarili nitong saklaw. Bilang isang kapantay na constitutional body, labas sa kapangyarihan ng pagsusuri ng Korte Suprema ang pagganap ng Senado sa mga tungkulin nito maliban na lamang kung mayroong grave abuse of discretion.

Gayunpaman, partikular para sa kasong ito at alang-alang sa interest of equity, itinuring ng Korte Suprema ang petisyon bilang isang petition for certiorari at sinuri kung kumilos ba ang Senado nang labag sa batas o labis sa diskresyon nito nang hindi ito agad nagpulong bilang isang impeachment court habang nasa session break.

Salungat sa posisyon ng petitioner, napatunayan ng Korte Suprema na umaksiyon ang Senado sa reklamo ng impeachment sa tamang panahon.

Bagama’t itinatakda ng Konstitusyon na dapat kumilos sa loob ng tiyak na bilang ng mga araw ng sesyon ukol sa reklamo ng impeachment ang House of Representatives o Mababang Kapulungan, walang tinukoy na takdang panahon para sa Senado para simulan ang paglilitis. Isinasaad lamang nito na dapat ito ay “shall forthwith proceed” o agad na ituloy ang paglilitis na nag-iiwan sa Senado ng diskresyon pagdating sa tiyempo nito.

Nilinaw ng Korte Suprema na ang salitang "forthwith" sa Article XI, Section 3(4) ng Konstitusyon ay nangangahulugang sa loob ng makatuwirang panahon, na maaaring mas mahaba o mas maikli depende sa mga pangyayari ng bawat kaso. Nagbibigay ito ng pagkakataon sa Senado na gawin ang mga kinakailangang paghahanda bago magpulong bilang isang impeachment court.

Bagama’t hindi nagtatakda ang Konstitusyon ng eksaktong petsa para sa paglilitis, dapat iwasan ng Senado ang hindi nararapat na pagkaantala para panindigan ang prinsipyo na dapat na may pananagutan sa mamamayan sa lahat ng oras ang mga opisyal ng bayan.

Itinuring ng Korte Suprema na moot na ang petisyon dahil nagsimula na ang Senado sa mga paghahanda para sa impeachment, at ang Articles of Impeachment laban kay Bise Presidente Duterte ay napawalang-bisa na ng Korte Suprema sa kanilang Desisyon noong Hulyo 25, 2025, at Resolusyon noong Enero 28, 2026, sa kasong Duterte v. House of Representatives. Itinuturing na moot ang isang kaso kapag naalis na sa anumang isyu ang mga sumunod na pangyayari kaya hindi na kinakailangan ang pasya ng Hukuman. Dahil wala nang natitirang Articles of Impeachment, wala nang dahilan ang Korte Suprema para utusan ang Senado na magpulong bilang isang impeachment court.

Nakiayon lamang si Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa naging resulta na moot na ang petisyon. Gayunpaman, nanindigan siya na dapat agad binuo ang impeachment court at dapat ang buong Senado at hindi lang ang Senate President ang nanguna sa pag-oorganisa nito. (Na-update ng ika-5:30 ng hapon, ngayong Abril 29, 2026.)

Hindi lumahok sa sesyon si Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa.

Ia-upload ang Desisyon at iba pang mga Opinyon kapag available na.

Basahin ang press briefer sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164510.

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Pinagtibay ng ang nauna nitong Desisyon na nagdeklarang napapaso ang kasong cyber libel sa loob ng isang taon mula nang matuklasan ito. Sinabi nito na hindi isang bagong krimen ang cyber libel kundi isang anyo lamang ng “libel” sa ilalim ng Artikulo 355 ng Revised Penal Code na isinasagawa sa pamamagitan ng computer system o iba pang katulad na paraan.

Sa isang Resolusyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, isinantabi ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema ang magkahiwalay na motion for reconsideration na inihain nina Berteni Cataluña Causing (Causing) at ng Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

Noong Disyembre 2020, naghain si Ferdinand L. Hernandez (Hernandez), Kinatawan ng Ikalawang Distrito ng Cotabato, ng reklamo para sa cyber libel laban kay Causing kaugnay ng mga Facebook post nito na nag-aakusa kay Hernandez na umano’y nagbulsa ng mahigit PHP 200 milyon na relief goods para sa mga biktima ng Marawi. Ayon kay Hernandez, natuklasan niya ang mga naturang post noong Pebrero 4 at Abril 29, 2019.

Nagsampa siya ng kaso sa Regional Trial Court (RTC) laban kay Causing noong Mayo 2021. Naghain siya ng motion to quash the Informations o mosyon para ipawalang-bisa ang mga Information at iginiit na napaso na ang mga ito alinsunod sa Revised Penal Code (RPC) dahil mahigit isang taon na ang lumipas mula nang mai-upload ang mga post.

Isinantabi ng RTC ang mosyon at nagpasya ito na may prescriptive period na 12 taon ang cyber libel sa ilalim ng Republic Act No. (RA) 10175 o Cybercrime Prevention Act.

Umapela si Causing sa Korte Suprema. Nilinaw ng Korte na isang taon mula sa petsa ng pagkakatuklas ang prescriptive period para sa cyber libel alinsunod sa tradisyunal na libel sa ilalim ng RPC. Pero isinantabi ng Korte ang mosyon ni Causing na ipawalang-bisa ang mga Information dahil sa kakulangan ng sapat na patunay na paso na nga ang krimen. Binigyang-diin ng Korte na maaari pa siyang magprisinta ng ebidensiya sa paglilitis sa RTC.

Kapwa naghain ang Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) at si Causing ng magkahiwalay na partial motion for reconsideration.

Sinabi ng OSG na hindi dapat ilapat sa cyber libel ang isang taong prescriptive period para sa tradisyunal na libel sa ilalim ng RPC. Sa halip, dapat umanong maging 15 taon ito sa ilalim ng Cybercrime Prevention Act, alinsunod sa naunang desisyon ng Korte Suprema sa isang resolusyon sa kasong Tolentino v. People.

Sa kabilang banda, iginiit ni Causing na dapat magsimula ang prescriptive period mula sa petsa ng publikasyon at hindi mula sa pagkakatuklas para sa cyber libel. Ayon sa kanya, mas malawak ang naaabot ng mga online post kumpara sa tradisyunal na paraan ng paglalathala. Kung paiiralin ang discovery rule, maaaring maisampa ang mga kaso ng cyber libel kahit ilang taon matapos mailathala ang post, basta’t huli lamang itong natuklasan ng naagrabyadong partido.

Tinanggihan ng Korte Suprema ang parehong argumento.

Ayon sa RPC, napapaso ang written libel sa loob ng isang taon. Walang batas na nagbubukod sa cyber libel mula sa isang taong prescriptive period na ito at patuloy na itinuring ng Kongreso ang libel bilang may mas maikling prescriptive period kumpara sa ibang krimen kahit pa tinaasan ang kaparusahan nito.

Muling iginiit din ng Korte Suprema na hindi hiwalay na krimen ang cyber libel kundi libel na isinagawa sa pamamagitan ng computer system. Kahit na mas mataas ang parusa sa cyber libel sa ilalim ng Cybercrime Prevention Act ay hindi nangangahulugang dapat ding pahabain ang prescriptive period nito lampas sa tradisyunal na libel.

Dagdag pa ng Korte, kapag hindi malinaw ang mga batas ukol sa prescription o pagkakapaso ng mga krimen, dapat itong desisyunan pabor sa akusado. Dahil itinatakda ng RPC ang isang taong prescriptive period para sa libel, ito ang mananaig laban sa 15 taon na itinakda ng isang unsigned resolution sa Tolentino v. People.

Pinagtibay din ng Korte na nagsisimula ang prescription mula sa pagkakatuklas ng krimen at hindi mula sa paglathala. Malinaw sa batas na tumatakbo ang prescription mula sa oras na matuklasan ang krimen ng naagrabyadong partido o ng mga awtoridad.

Pitong Mahistrado ang nakiayon kay Justice Inting sa mayorya. Sila ay sina:
-Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo
-Senior Associate Justice Marvic MVF Leonen
-Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa
-Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda
-Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan
-Associate Justice Jose Midas P. Marquez
-Associate Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

Sa kanyang Concurring Opinion, iginiit ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen na dapat ilapat lamang sa mga kasong libel laban sa mga pribadong indibidwal ang isang taong prescriptive period. Dagdag pa niya, dapat nang i-decriminalize ang libel laban sa mga public figure sapagkat ang pagpaparusa sa mga komento at kritisismong nakatuon sa mga opisyal ng pamahalaan ay pumipigil sa malaya at walang hadlang na talakayan tungkol sa kung paano nila ginagampanan ang kanilang tungkulin.

Sa kanyang Concurring Opinion, binigyang-diin naman ni Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa na matagal nang itinakda sa isa o dalawang taon ang prescriptive period para sa libel at hindi kailanman umabot sa 10 taon o higit pa.

Samantala, anim na Mahistrado ang nakiayon kay Associate Justice Antonio Kho, Jr. sa kanyang dissent:
-Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando
-Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier
-Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario
-Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez
-Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao
-Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva

Sa kanyang Concurring at Dissenting Opinion, sumang-ayon si Justice Kho, Jr. sa mayorya na hindi nagtatakda ng mga doktrina ng batas ang mga unsigned resolution. Pero hindi siya sumang-ayon sa itinakdang prescriptive period para sa cyber libel. Ayon sa kanya, dahil isinasagawa sa pamamagitan ng mga computer system ang cyber libel at pinarurusahan sa ilalim ng Cybercrime Prevention Act, isang hiwalay na krimen ito mula sa libel kaya’t hindi dapat ilapat dito ang isang taong prescriptive period.

Basahin ang press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163671

Basahin ang buong Resolusyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163636

Basahin ang Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Senior Associate Justice
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163642

Basahin ang Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/wp-admin/post.php?p=163650

Basahin ang Sumasang-ayon at Hindi Sumasang-ayon na Opinyon ni Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr.: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163661

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) has ruled that sounds incident to the operation of an educational institution, those arising from a school’s regular activities, are not considered a nuisance and cannot make the school liable for damages.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC’s Third Division granted the petition of Couples for Christ School of the Morning Star (School) and reversed the Court of Appeals’ (CA) ruling that awarded damages to residents of Saint Joseph Subdivision in Barangay Villa Kananga, Butuan City, where the school is located.

Wideline I. Malonda and others, who are residents of the Subdivision, claimed they were often exposed to loud noises from the School, such as drums and bugles being played, teachers speaking through microphones and megaphones, and students running, cheering and shouting during games played at the multipurpose center.

The residents claimed that these sounds, heard day and night, disturbed their sleep and peace at home.

In its defense, the School said it has been operating since 2012 with the necessary permits and clearances and that any noise comes only from regular classes. It added that the City Environment and Natural Resources Office conducted a test and found the noise to be within the allowed limits for residential areas. The School also claimed it took steps to reduce noise, such as building higher fences, planting trees, using small speakers, and limiting activities to 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. on weekdays.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the residents’ complaint, ruling that they failed to prove they were harmed by the noise. The RTC also found that the School did not intend to harm the residents and acted in good faith by taking steps to reduce the noise.

On appeal, the CA ruled in the residents’ favor, holding that the School’s noise, which came not only from classes but also from other social functions in the multi-purpose hall, was a nuisance that caused discomfort and annoyance to the residents.

The SC overturned the CA’s ruling. It held that academic noise, or sounds from legitimate school activities, is not a nuisance.

Nuisance includes any disturbance that interferes with a person, property or comfort and enjoyment of all citizens. The SC ruled that the determination of whether a noise is a nuisance requires more than just considering the location, environment, and its effect on residents.

Thus, for noise to be considered nuisance, the SC considered in the 𝘍𝘳𝘢𝘣𝘦𝘭𝘭𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘱𝘦𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘊𝘰𝘳𝘱. 𝘷. 𝘈𝘊 𝘌𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘳𝘱𝘳𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘐𝘯𝘤. the:

1. reliability of the noise pollution tests conducted,
2. introduction by the defendant of measures or improvements to mitigate the noise,
3. allowable noise levels,
4. defendant’s intention (or lack thereof) to cause harm to the plaintiff,
5. number of complaining witnesses,
6. representativeness of the plaintiff, and
7. actions of the plaintiff to alleviate his or her plight.

Adopting the framework, the SC finds that the sounds emanating from the School arose from its ordinary operations as an educational institution, and that the respondents are hardly representative of the community.

The SC also ruled that the residents failed to prove that the noise was unreasonably disturbing and that it worsened their health conditions. The residents’ statements showed only minor discomforts, not serious harm.

The SC added that while location and environment are important in determining a nuisance, they must be weighed against whether the noise is normally expected from the activity involved. Here, the sounds complained of did not go beyond what could be reasonably expected from a school.

The SC emphasized that there is no nuisance if an ordinary person would not find the sound disturbing, even if someone else is unusually sensitive to it.

The SC explained:

“𝘓𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘪𝘯 𝘢 𝘥𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘭𝘺 𝘱𝘰𝘱𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘤𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘵𝘳𝘺 𝘴𝘶𝘤𝘩 𝘢𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘗𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴, 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘦 𝘩𝘰𝘶𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘪𝘯𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘤𝘭𝘰𝘴𝘦 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘹𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘵𝘺, 𝘢𝘮𝘱𝘭𝘪𝘧𝘪𝘦𝘴 𝘱𝘦𝘰𝘱𝘭𝘦’𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦. 𝘏𝘰𝘸𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘳, 𝘯𝘰𝘵 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘬𝘪𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘭𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘳𝘦 𝘢𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘢𝘣𝘭𝘦. 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘶𝘭𝘢𝘳𝘭𝘺, 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘪𝘷𝘪𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 𝘳𝘦𝘨𝘢𝘳𝘥𝘴 𝘯𝘰𝘪𝘴𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘯𝘶𝘪𝘴𝘢𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘰𝘯𝘭𝘺 𝘸𝘩𝘦𝘯 𝘪𝘵 𝘳𝘦𝘢𝘤𝘩𝘦𝘴 𝘢𝘯 𝘪𝘯𝘵𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘩𝘢𝘵 𝘪𝘯𝘫𝘶𝘳𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘯𝘨𝘦𝘳𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘩𝘦𝘢𝘭𝘵𝘩 𝘰𝘳 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳𝘴, 𝘰𝘳 𝘢𝘯𝘯𝘰𝘺𝘴 𝘰𝘳 𝘰𝘧𝘧𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘦𝘴.”

The SC also denied the claim for damages since the School did not intend to harm or annoy the residents and had taken steps to reduce the noise. There was no evidence that the school caused the noise willfully, with malice or bad faith.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163502

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=163486

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278875-formerly-udk-no-18061-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

The (SC) clarified the application of lascivious conduct under 𝘙𝘦𝘱𝘶𝘣𝘭𝘪𝘤 𝘈𝘤𝘵 (𝘙𝘈) 𝘕𝘰. 7610, or 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘚𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘈𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘌𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘋𝘪𝘴𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵, in relation to acts of lasciviousness under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting, the SC 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 upheld Jeffrey L. Gramatica’s conviction for lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, but modified another accused’s ( # # #2660399) conviction for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 366 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊.

In these consolidated cases involving minors, AAA, BBB, and CCC, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines to ensure the proper prosecution of cases under these two distinct laws.

AAA and BBB, both addicted to shabu, engaged in s*xual acts with Gramatica and another man in exchange for the drug. Gramatica was later arrested and prosecuted for violation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610, which penalizes lascivious conduct committed against a child exploited in prostitution or other s*xual abuse.

In the other case, CCC was victimized by her grandfather, # # #266039, who touched her private parts while she was sleeping. # # #266039 was also charged under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610.

In his defense, Gramatica claimed that he courted BBB and had a s*xual relationship with her but did not know she was a minor because she looked mature. For his part, # # #266039 denied the charges and claimed he merely woke CCC up to ask her for help applying his eye medicine.

The Regional Trial Court found both Gramatica and # # #266039 guilty of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 towards BBB and CCC, respectively. The Court of Appeals affirmed their convictions.

A minor is considered to have been subjected to other s*xual abuse when they are a victim of lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of an adult. In this case, BBB was 14 and CCC was 17 at the time of the incident. Gramatica was 23, and # # #266039 was 62.

Both courts found that Gramatica took advantage of BBB’s youth and vulnerable situation, using his influence over her to make her submit to his s*xual demands. Meanwhile, # # #266039, due to his age and relationship as CCC’s grandfather, was able to exert control over her and exploit her trust.

The SC affirmed Gramatica’s conviction under RA 7610, but modified # # #266039’s conviction from acts of lasciviousness under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 to acts of lasciviousness under the RPC explaining that RA 7610 does not apply where the minor is entirely unaware, coerced or unconscious as the victim in that instance is not considered to have “indulged” in the s*xual in*******se.

A plain and straightforward interpretation of 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 provides a clear definition of children subjected to other s*xual abuse as those who indulge in s*xual in*******se or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of an adult.

The SC clarified the scope of lascivious conduct under 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 and distinguished it from related crimes under the RPC. To ensure uniform and consistent prosecution of cases, the Supreme Court laid down guidelines, considering also RA 11648, which raised the age of s*xual consent to 16 years old.

𝙁𝙞𝙧𝙨𝙩, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 applies to children who are 12 years of age (now 16 years old following the amendment under RA 11648) to below 18 who are subjected to s*xual abuse.

𝙎𝙚𝙘𝙤𝙣𝙙, it covers situations where consent is present but defective. The minor may seem to “indulge” or agree, but does so not out of free will, but because of coercion or influence by an adult. Thus, engaging in s*xual acts with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to s*xual abuse is a criminal act, regardless of apparent consent.

𝙏𝙝𝙞𝙧𝙙, it does not apply when the act involves force, intimidation, fraud, deprivation of reason, unconsciousness, or grave abuse of authority. In such cases, the crime falls under acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

𝙁𝙤𝙪𝙧𝙩𝙝, if the victim is under 12 or under 16, and the case does not fit Section 5(b), the crime is r**e or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC.

These principles, which distinguish force and intimidation on one hand, and coercion and influence on the other, and limit RA 7610 to minors who are exploited in prostitution or s*xual abuse, also apply to other s*xual crimes, including r**e.

In this case, BBB was a child exploited in prostitution or other s*xual abuse because she had s*xual in*******se with Gramatica in exchange for some consideration, namely shabu, which makes him criminally liable under Section 5(b).

Meanwhile, 𝘚𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 5(𝘣) 𝘰𝘧 𝘙𝘈 7610 does not apply to # # #266039.

The Supreme Court clarified that not all acts of lasciviousness against minors aged 12 to under 18 are covered by RA 7610. The law applies only when minors are subjected to s*xual abuse, such as when they “indulge” or give defective consent to the conduct.

Here, CCC did not indulge in lascivious conduct, as she was asleep and unconscious during the incident. # # #266039 did not use coercion or influence, but relied on his moral ascendancy as her grandfather, which counts as intimidation. These circumstances make # # #266039 liable for acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, rather than RA 7610.

For lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) involving BBB, Gramatica was sentenced to a maximum of 17 years, four months, and one day in prison and ordered to pay BBB PHP 150,000 in civil indemnity and damages, as well as a PHP 15,000 fine.

For acts of lasciviousness under 𝘈𝘳𝘵𝘪𝘤𝘭𝘦 336 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘙𝘗𝘊, # # #266039 was sentenced to a maximum of six years in prison and ordered to pay CCC PHP450,000 in civil indemnity and damages with interest.

The SC acknowledged that under current laws, # # #266039, “who committed abhorrent and be***al acts against his minor granddaughter,” faces a penalty lower than that under RA 7610, and called on the legislature to amend existing laws to better protect children.

The SC calls the legislature to review and amend current laws protecting children, thus:

“𝘐𝘯 𝘭𝘪𝘯𝘦 𝘸𝘪𝘵𝘩 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘢𝘣𝘰𝘷𝘦, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘪𝘯 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘰𝘧 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘶𝘳𝘵’𝘴 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘵𝘰 𝘶𝘱𝘩𝘰𝘭𝘥 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘊𝘰𝘯𝘴𝘵𝘪𝘵𝘶𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯, 𝘸𝘩𝘪𝘤𝘩 𝘮𝘢𝘯𝘥𝘢𝘵𝘦𝘴 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘱𝘦𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘱𝘳𝘰𝘵𝘦𝘤𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘰𝘧 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘧𝘳𝘰𝘮 𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘧𝘰𝘳𝘮𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘯𝘦𝘨𝘭𝘦𝘤𝘵, 𝘢𝘣𝘶𝘴𝘦, 𝘤𝘳𝘶𝘦𝘭𝘵𝘺, 𝘦𝘹𝘱𝘭𝘰𝘪𝘵𝘢𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘰𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘳 𝘤𝘰𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯𝘴 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘫𝘶𝘥𝘪𝘤𝘪𝘢𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘥𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘭𝘰𝘱𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, 𝘭𝘦𝘵 𝘵𝘩𝘪𝘴 𝘴𝘦𝘳𝘷𝘦 𝘢𝘴 𝘢 𝘤𝘢𝘭𝘭 𝘵𝘰 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘭𝘦𝘨𝘪𝘴𝘭𝘢𝘵𝘶𝘳𝘦 𝘵𝘰 𝘧𝘶𝘭𝘧𝘪𝘭𝘭 𝘪𝘵𝘴 𝘣𝘰𝘶𝘯𝘥𝘦𝘯 𝘥𝘶𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘦𝘸𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘢𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘥𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘱𝘳𝘦𝘴𝘦𝘯𝘵 𝘭𝘢𝘸𝘴 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘦𝘯𝘴𝘶𝘳𝘪𝘯𝘨 𝘵𝘩𝘦 𝘴𝘢𝘧𝘦𝘵𝘺, 𝘸𝘦𝘭𝘭-𝘣𝘦𝘪𝘯𝘨, 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘥𝘪𝘨𝘯𝘪𝘵𝘺 𝘰𝘧 𝘰𝘶𝘳 𝘍𝘪𝘭𝘪𝘱𝘪𝘯𝘰 𝘤𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯.”

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162863

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=162842

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260233-266039-separate-concurring-opinion-associate-justice-rodil-v-zalameda/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution