Yngayo Law Office

The (SC) has ruled that the infliction of psychological violence, if done through Facebook, is considered done through information and communications technology, which warrants the imposition of a higher penalty pursuant to Section 6 of RA 10175 or the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012.

In a Resolution penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando, the SC’s First Division affirmed with modification its October 22, 2025 Decision (assailed Decision), which upheld the conviction of an individual ( # # #) for committing psychological violence under Section 5(i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (Anti-VAWC Act) against his ex-girlfriend (AAA) by posting derogatory statements about her on Facebook.

The SC, however, resolved to raise the penalty by one degree, considering that the offense was committed through Facebook, as adequately alleged in the Information and established during trial.

AAA filed the VAWC case against her former partner # # # after he posted a statement on Facebook calling her a dirty woman and an animal, and threatening to box her when he sees her. He repeated the insults in the comments to the post, which was public.

During trial, AAA presented screenshots of the Facebook post and testified that she had created for # # # the Facebook account which made the post. Her two siblings testified that the account was # # #’s and that they received messages from him through the same account.

Despite # # #’s denial, the SC, in its assailed Decision, affirmed the decisions of the Family Court and the Court of Appeals (CA) convicting # # #, stressing that in criminal cases, the prosecution must prove not only the elements of the crime but also the identity of the offender. The SC also upheld the penalty imposed by the CA, consisting of imprisonment for six months and one day to eight years and one day, a fine of PHP 100,000, and psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Resolving # # #’s Motion for Reconsideration, the SC held that # # #’s authorship of the Facebook post was established beyond reasonable doubt, using the guideposts it established in its assailed Decision:

𝟏. 𝐀𝐝𝐦𝐢𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐨𝐟 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩;
𝟐. 𝐁𝐞𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐬𝐞𝐞𝐧 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐫 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭;
𝟑. 𝐂𝐨𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐢𝐧𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐦𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐤𝐧𝐨𝐰𝐧 𝐨𝐧𝐥𝐲 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫 𝐨𝐫 𝐚 𝐟𝐞𝐰 𝐩𝐞𝐨𝐩𝐥𝐞;
𝟒. 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐠𝐮𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫’𝐬 𝐜𝐡𝐚𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐬;
𝟓. 𝐑𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐢𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐞𝐭 𝐬𝐞𝐫𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐫, 𝐭𝐞𝐥𝐞𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐦𝐮𝐧𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐦𝐩𝐚𝐧𝐲, 𝐨𝐫 𝐬𝐨𝐜𝐢𝐚𝐥 𝐦𝐞𝐝𝐢𝐚 𝐬𝐢𝐭𝐞, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐮𝐥𝐭𝐬 𝐟𝐫𝐨𝐦 𝐝𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐜𝐞 𝐟𝐨𝐫𝐞𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐜 𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐬𝐢𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐠𝐞𝐨𝐥𝐨𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐞𝐚𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞𝐬, 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐫𝐢𝐛𝐮𝐭𝐞𝐬 𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐤𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐭𝐨 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐨𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐞𝐫;
𝟔. 𝐀𝐜𝐭𝐬 𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐢𝐬𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐰𝐢𝐭𝐡 𝐩𝐫𝐞𝐯𝐢𝐨𝐮𝐬 𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐭𝐬; 𝐨𝐫
𝟕. 𝐎𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫 𝐢𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐬 𝐬𝐡𝐨𝐰𝐢𝐧𝐠 𝐨𝐰𝐧𝐞𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩, 𝐚𝐜𝐜𝐞𝐬𝐬, 𝐨𝐫 𝐚𝐮𝐭𝐡𝐨𝐫𝐬𝐡𝐢𝐩.

The authorship of the Facebook post and all the elements of psychological violence having been established, the SC said Section 6 of the 𝘊𝘺𝘣𝘦𝘳𝘤𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘦 𝘗𝘳𝘦𝘷𝘦𝘯𝘵𝘪𝘰𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2012 applies, which mandates the imposition of a penalty higher by one degree for crimes and offenses committed using ICT. The use of ICT can enable offenders to evade liability, reach more victims, or cause greater harm.

Citing the definition of ICT, the Court ruled that social media platforms, such as Facebook, qualify as ICT systems because they allow users to generate, send, receive, store, and process electronic data messages through computers, mobile phones, or similar electronic devices.

In this case, the Information alleged that # # # made the Facebook post using his "Facebook Messenger Account… which was set to public view." The SC ruled that this statement constitutes a sufficient allegation of the use of ICT as a qualifying circumstance. Even if the term "ICT" was not stated, the Information adequately informed # # # that he is being charged of inflicting psychological violence upon AAA through Facebook, which falls under the contemplation of an ICT system.

The allegation was established by the prosecution during trial.

Thus, the Court increased the penalty by one degree from six months and one day to eight years and one day to imprisonment of six years and one day to 14 years, eight months, and one day, but retained the fined PHP 100,000. He was likewise ordered to undergo psychological counseling or psychiatric treatment.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168987

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=168968

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution

The has clarified that the rules on modifying circumstances—factors that can lessen or increase penalties—apply in cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide involving a motor vehicle.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC En Banc upheld Noli Z. Ilon’s (Ilon) conviction for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, but reduced his sentence because he voluntarily surrendered to the police.

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), reckless imprudence is acting without intent to harm but still causing injury or death to another due to a clear lack of precaution. The SC emphasized that motorists are expected to drive at a reasonable speed suited to road and weather conditions, especially near intersections. In this case, Ilon admitted that he failed to slow down despite knowing he was approaching an intersection. He even increased his speed, leading him to hit the trisikad that caused Lee de la Cruz’s death.

The SC clarified that Ilon’s voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance that reduces his penalty. It explained that while Article 365 of the RPC generally allows trial courts to impose penalties without applying the rules on mitigating and aggravating circumstances under Article 64 of the RPC, this does not apply when reckless imprudence results in death involving a motor vehicle. In such cases, Article 64 must be followed.

The SC reviewed the amendments to Article 365—from Act No. 3992, or the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, passed in 1932, through Batas Pambansa Blg. 398 passed in 1983—and found that Congress consistently retained the clause excluding cases where death results from reckless imprudence involving motor vehicles from the usual discretion given to trial courts. This means that courts must apply Article 64 to determine the proper penalty.

The SC observed, however, an inconsistency: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide with the use of a motor vehicle may be mitigated, while those resulting in serious bodily injury or damage to property are left to the discretion of the trial courts. Finding this distinction unjust, the SC directed that copies of its Decision be furnished to the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, to alert its co-equal branches of this inconsistency and for possible legislative action.

Ilon was sentenced to up to two years and four months in prison and ordered to pay the heirs of de la Cruz PHP 629,883.45 in damages.

In his Concurring Opinion, Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen noted that piecemeal amendments to the RPC have led to inconsistencies in criminal law. He called for the consolidation of all criminal provisions into a single, unified code to ensure fairness, clarity, and the orderly administration of justice.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166162

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260538-noli-z-ilon-vs-people-of-the-philippines/

Read the full text of the Concurring Opinion at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/260538-concurring-opinion-senior-associate-justice-marvic-m-v-f-leonen/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/

📣 𝗦𝗘𝗖 𝘀𝘂𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗱𝘀 𝗺𝗼𝗻𝘁𝗵𝗹𝘆 𝗽𝗲𝗻𝗮𝗹𝘁𝗶𝗲𝘀 𝗳𝗼𝗿 𝗹𝗮𝘁𝗲, 𝗻𝗼𝗻-𝗳𝗶𝗹𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗳 𝗿𝗲𝗽𝗼𝗿𝘁𝘀

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is suspending until December 31, 2026 the imposition of monthly penalties in the late or non-filing of reportorial requirements, as it seeks to reduce transaction costs and promote the ease of doing business.

In its meeting on May 5, the Commission En Banc approved the suspension of penalties imposed for every month of delay for the late or non-filing of reportorial requirements, as provided under SEC Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 2024 (MC 6).

“As we celebrate the Ease of Doing Business month this May, the SEC reaffirms its commitment to foster a robust and responsive business environment,” SEC Chairperson Francis Lim said.

“By suspending the compounding monthly penalties, we are providing corporations an opportunity to get back their good standing without the burden of mounting transaction costs, as part of our goal of pushing corporations toward full compliance and sustainable growth,” he added.

The suspension will apply to corporations with pending monitoring applications. Corporations that have received final assessments but have not yet settled payment will be issued updated assessments excluding the per month of delay components.

Read the full memorandum circular here: https://www.sec.gov.ph/mc-2026/sec-mc-no-16-series-of-2026suspension-of-the-per-month-of-delay-penalty-for-late-and-non-filing-of-reportorial-requirements-under-sec-memorandum-circular-no-6-series-of-2024/

Read the full press release here: https://www.sec.gov.ph/pr-2026/sec-suspends-monthly-penalties-for-late-non-filing-of-reports/

SUPREME COURT ORDERS UNIVERSITY TO PAY P6 MILLION IN DAMAGES FOR NEGLIGENCE THAT CAUSED STUDENT DEATH

FIRST ON BATAS PH: The Supreme Court (SC) has ordered the University of Southeastern Philippines to pay PHP 6,450,000 in total damages to the parents of a student who died from severe burn injuries after her costume caught fire during a university-organized event, which have arisen from negligence in the conduct and safety arrangements of the activity.

In a 46-page decision penned by Senior Associate Justice Marvic Leonen, the SC En Banc has found the University of Southeastern Philippines, represented by its president, Dr. Romulo Dequito; Dr. Marie Rose Escalada; Dr. Gilbert Gordo; Professor Catherine Roble; and Ms. Emma Gobantes jointly and severally liable for damages for the death of Cheryl Sarate.

In 2006, the Guild of English Students, a recognized student organization in the university, organized a beauty pageant in the university's social hall. The organizers installed a T-shaped ramp lined with 12 small, lit candles in brown paper bags filled with damp soil. Each paper bag was tied with crepe paper, and the opening of the bags was structured like a crown to resemble a lantern. Some of the social hall's lights were switched off to highlight the candlelight.

Cheryl was the fourth candidate to walk for the pageant. She wore a snow fairy ensemble made of cotton balls glued to plastic cellophane, typically used to cover books. The lower skirt was on a tie wire to create a petticoat design. Its hem was covered with small feathers. Her tube top was covered with rolled cotton flattened to her chest.

The top of her blouse was attached to a tie wire. She held a rattan scepter and wore a butterfly headdress. Cheryl was standing on the leftmost side of the T-shaped ramp when her gown caught fire as she turned to pose. When she turned right to walk to the center ramp, she used her bare hands to ward off the small flames that
started to engulf her.

On the center ramp, the flames blazed, causing Cheryl to jump over the right side of the hall where the audience sat. She tripped as she screamed for help. Some students tried to help, and the fires were eventually put out. After the fire, Cheryl was seen topless, wearing only denim short pants. People tried to hug and console her. The ambulance arrived 30 minutes later and brought Cheryl to the hospital. Despite this, the pageant resumed. The organizers admitted that no faculty member was present to supervise the event, except for those who participated as judges.

Students said they had not seen fire extinguishers in the venue, although the university maintained that there were two inside the social hall. Eventually Cheryl died in the hospital due to "cardiac arrest due to septic shock; the antecedent cause is secondary to flame burn, 80% total body surface area (TBSA) involving face, neck, anterior chest, back, and both upper and lower extremities." Cheryl's parents, Antonio and Rosita Sarate, then filed a case for damages against the University of Southeastern Philippines and the Guild of English Students.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the University and the Guild of English Students jointly and severally liable for the incident. It found that the university is negligent for its lack of preparedness for foreseeable emergencies. The RTC later on modified its first ruling by granting the university's motion for partial reconsideration and absolving it from liability and declared the guild adviser and university faculty member solely liable for the incident. Dismayed, the parents of the victim elevated the case before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court granted the appeal and reinstated the first ruling of the RTC. The CA found the university liable through its administrators and officers-in-charge based on paragraph 4 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, since there was collective negligence between them. This paved the way for the university to file an appeal before the Supreme Court.

In affirming the CA ruling with modification, the high court noted that under Articles 218 and 219 of the Family Code, schools, its administrators, and its teachers have special parental authority and responsibility over minors under their supervision, instruction, or custody, making them principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by them, and this liability applies to all their authorized activities.

The SC emphasized that the university failed to exercise the diligence required of it as an educational institution. During the incident, it was only the students who put out the fire, without help from employees of the university. The university failed to train personnel to conduct first aid, shown by the fact that only students attempted to help Cheryl.

It also flagged the university's lack of preparedness to address the emergency due to its failure to sound the fire alarm and no one used the fire extinguishers the university claims were available.

The highest bench did not give credence to the defense of the university attempting to escape liability by arguing that the beauty pageant organized by the Guild was an unauthorized activity. It insisted that the Guild did not have the required permit to hold the event, making it a private affair, and the pageant, which was held on a weekday, violated the school policy to hold extracurricular activities only during weekends.

The court highlighted that it is not right for the university to easily deny any connection with the Guild, insisting that the pageant was a private affair, especially since the latter is a campus organization, of which the members are the enrolled students of the university and the adviser of which is a permanent employee of the university.

"The holding of the activity on a date different from the schedule and the fact that it violated the university's policy of holding activities only on weekends does not make the activity illegal or unauthorized but may only open [petitioner] Roble, as its adviser, to administrative sanctions from the school," the Supreme Court said.

It cited the findings of the RTC, holding petitioner Roble's negligence as Guild adviser in the supervision and instruction of the Guild members can be considered the natural, continuous sequence preceding the cause of Cheryl's death."

The high court held that Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code are also applicable in this case, which makes the university, as an employer, liable for the damages caused by its employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.

"There is also collective negligence on the part of the petitioner university, through its administrators and officers-in-charge, when it failed to exercise due diligence in taking safety measures to ensure that no unfortunate incident would happen for those who would use its facilities," it added.

The high court ordered the university and its co-respondents to pay the parents of Cheryl PHP 300,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 5,000,000 as moral damages, PHP 1,000,000 as exemplary damages, and PHP 150,000 as attorney's fees.

The has ruled that non-verbal threatening gestures with criminal intent may be considered grave threats under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (𝘙𝘗𝘊).

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa, the SC’s Third Division acquitted Gregory Israel of grave threats after finding no criminal intent in his gesture of pretending to shoot and behead two individuals.

But it clarified that the crime of grave threats may be committed through non-verbal gestures and not only through spoken or written words.

Israel, who claimed to be a Belgian architect allowed to practice his profession in the Philippines, was hired by Belgian business partners Christine Helena Amanda Navez and Olivier Edmund Denonville for the construction of their building. After Israel refused to correct the construction defects in the said building, Navez and Denonville filed a case for damages against him.

Sometime in 2017, while Navez and Denonville were on their way home from the airport, they nearly collided with Israel’s motorcycle. The latter then allegedly made two overt gestures: pointing his fingers at Navez’s head as if pulling a gun trigger and drawing his fingers across his neck as if threatening to behead Navez.

Israel was convicted of grave threats. When his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, he sought relief from the SC, arguing that he had no criminal intent when he performed the acts, and that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not cover pure non-verbal gestures.

The SC acquitted Israel after finding that criminal intent was not proven. But it disagreed with his other argument, ruling that non-verbal gestures may be considered grave threats.

To convict for grave threats, the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 requires two elements: the 𝗮𝗰𝘁𝘂𝗮𝗹 𝘀𝗽𝗲𝗮𝗸𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗿 𝘂𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿𝗶𝗻𝗴 𝗼𝗳 𝘁𝗵𝗲 𝘁𝗵𝗿𝗲𝗮𝘁𝘀 and the 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗲𝗻𝘁 𝘁𝗼 𝗶𝗻𝘁𝗶𝗺𝗶𝗱𝗮𝘁𝗲.

The SC held that Article 282 of the 𝘙𝘗𝘊 does not differentiate between threats conveyed verbally and those expressed through non-verbal gestures. What matters is the communication of a threat intended to intimidate.

Although the second paragraph of the provision specifies that threats can be conveyed orally or in writing, it does not exclude threats conveyed through non-verbal means. Therefore, threats can be either verbal or non-verbal.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=166072.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164941.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The has acquitted a man charged with violence against women and their children, or VAWC, for allegedly refusing to provide financial support to a child not proven to be his, emphasizing that a legal duty to provide financial support arises only after filiation or paternity has been established.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, the SC’s Third Division reversed the rulings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, which found the accused guilty of economic abuse under Republic Act No. 9262, or the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘪𝘰𝘭𝘦𝘯𝘤𝘦 𝘈𝘨𝘢𝘪𝘯𝘴𝘵 𝘞𝘰𝘮𝘦𝘯 𝘢𝘯𝘥 𝘛𝘩𝘦𝘪𝘳 𝘊𝘩𝘪𝘭𝘥𝘳𝘦𝘯 𝘈𝘤𝘵 𝘰𝘧 2004 (𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵).

The case arose from a complaint filed by a woman against her former boyfriend, accusing him of refusing to provide financial support for her child.

The accused consistently denied he was the father, claiming that the child was born only eight months after they last had sexual relations.

During trial, the woman presented the child’s birth certificate as evidence. However, the portion indicating the father’s name, was marked "𝘕/𝘈" and left unsigned.

The woman also admitted in court that the accused refused to give financial support because he doubted that he was the child’s father.

In reversing the accused’s conviction, the SC explained that to convict a person for economic abuse under Section 5(i) of the 𝘈𝘯𝘵𝘪-𝘝𝘈𝘞𝘊 𝘈𝘤𝘵, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the victim is a woman and/or her child; (2) the woman is the offender’s wife or partner, or someone with whom the offender has a common child; (3) the offender refused to give financial support due; and (4) the refusal was intended to cause mental or emotional suffering.

In this case, the SC ruled that the prosecution failed to prove two essential elements: that the accused and the woman share a common child, and that the refusal to provide support was done to inflict psychological harm.

As the accused’s paternity was not proven in this case, no legal obligation to provide support could be imposed.

Read the full text of the Press Release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164663.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=164655.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution.

NBI EXPLAINS

Understanding the AFASA Law

(Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act)

PASAY CITY, Philippines — Sa paglaganap ng online banking, digital wallets, at electronic money transfers, mas naging moderno at mas sopistikado rin ang mga pinansyal na scam at panloloko. Upang higit na mapalakas ang proteksyon ng publiko laban sa mga cyber-enabled financial fraud, ipinasa ng Pilipinas ang Republic Act No. 12010 o mas kilala bilang Anti-Financial Account Scamming Act (AFASA).

In simple terms, AFASA is a law designed to protect the public from scams involving bank accounts, e-wallets, online banking, and other financial accounts used in fraudulent activities.

What does AFASA punish?

AFASA penalizes individuals who use financial accounts to commit scams, fraud, or illegal transactions. These include:

1. Using another person’s bank or e-wallet account for fraudulent activities;
2. Selling or allowing others to use your account for scams;
3. Opening “dummy accounts” or “mule accounts” for criminal syndicates;
4. Phishing, social engineering, or tricking victims into giving OTPs or passwords;
5. Using stolen identities to create financial accounts;
6. Possessing or using devices or software intended for financial fraud.

Ano ang “money mule”?

Isa sa mga karaniwang modus na ginagamit ngayon ng mga scammer ay ang paggamit ng tinatawag na “money mule.”

Ang “money mule” ay isang tao na nagpapagamit ng kaniyang bank account, e-wallet, ATM account, o iba pang digital account upang tumanggap at maglipat ng perang nagmumula sa ilegal na gawain o panloloko.

Some people are deceived into becoming money mules by offers of easy money or online jobs. Others knowingly allow their accounts to be used in exchange for commissions.

Under AFASA, even allowing your account to be used for fraudulent transactions may result in criminal liability.

Common scams covered by AFASA:

1' Online banking fraud;
2. Fake investment scams;
3. OTP scams;
4. Phishing links;
5. Fake online selling;
6. E-wallet fraud;
7. Account takeovers;
8. Online lending harassment involving illegal fund transfers;
9. Social engineering scams.

Important reminder to the public:
Never give your:

1. OTP;
2. PIN;
3. Password;
4. Online banking credentials; and
5. E-wallet verification codes to anyone.

Ang mga bangko, e-wallet companies, at mga lehitimong institusyon ay hindi kailanman nanghihingi ng mga sensitibong inpormasyon through text messages, phone calls, or social media chats.

Pinapaalalahanan ng NBI ang publiko na huwag kailanman ibenta, ipahiram, o ipagamit sa iba ang kanilang bank account o e-wallet account. Ang maaaring magmukhang simpleng pabor o madaling pagkakakitaan ay maaaring magresulta sa pananagutang kriminal at pagsasampa ng kaso laban sa inyo sa ilalim ng AFASA law.

The NBI continues to strengthen its cybercrime, anti-fraud, and digital forensic capabilities in addressing emerging financial and cyber-enabled crimes in the country.