De Guzman Law Office and Notarial Services

The (SC) 𝘌𝘯 𝘉𝘢𝘯𝘤 has issued guidelines in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, clarifying that it must be evaluated based on the person’s true intent and the totality of the circumstances.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan, the SC granted the accused’s petition and reduced his sentence, recognizing his surrender as voluntary even if he surrendered after learning of the issuance of arrest warrant against him.

The accused went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to apply for clearance. During processing, his name registered a “hit”, indicating he had a pending case. He admitted this to the NBI officer.

He was instructed to return after one week while the records were being verified. When he came back, the NBI officer confirmed he had a pending bigamy case and an outstanding warrant for his arrest issued 13 years earlier. He then told the officer, “masuko na lang ako” (I will surrender) and asked help in posting bail. The arrest warrant was then served on him.

The NBI later issued a certificate stating that he voluntarily surrendered to their office. However, the return of the warrant and order of release described him as having been “arrested.”

During arraignment, the accused first pleaded not guilty but later entered into a plea bargain, asking the court to consider his voluntary surrender and guilty plea.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him of bigamy and considered his plea of guilt, but ruled that he did not voluntarily surrender. It relied on the warrant’s return and release order, which stated that he was “arrested,” and noted that the case had been pending for 13 years because he could not be located. The Court of Appeals affirmed this, finding that he went to the NBI not to surrender but to apply for clearance, and that when he said he would surrender, he had no choice because he was already inside the NBI office.

The SC disagreed.

Under Article 13(7) of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been arrested; they surrendered themselves to a person in authority or its agent; and the surrender was voluntary.

In this case, the accused returned to the NBI and said he would surrender before the arrest warrant was actually served on him. He had not yet been arrested. He also surrendered to an NBI officer, a person in authority.

The SC ruled that voluntary surrender must be viewed with a “more considerate and broad-minded approach” once guilt has been established. It stressed that voluntary surrender must be assessed through the totality of circumstances, laying down the following guiding principles:

1. The voluntariness and spontaneity of the surrender must show that offender either admits their guilt or wish to spare authorities the trouble of searching for and arresting them.

2. The circumstances of the voluntary surrender is independent of the fact of the issuance of the arrest warrant. The mere fact of the arrest warrant’s prior issuance should not be taken against the accused’s claim of voluntary surrender when other circumstances point to the fulfillment of all requirements, including voluntariness. However, knowledge of the accused of the existence of an arrest warrant against them and their continued evasion of justice can negate voluntariness and spontaneity.

3. The lapse of time an accused used to evade the law could be a criterion in negating spontaneity.

4. Voluntariness is not negated by the fact that there is likelihood that the accused may be arrested anytime before they surrendered. Imminence of arrest should be coupled with an indication that the accused fled or could further escape and evade, before it could deny voluntariness.

5. The intention of the accused at the time of surrender must be considered with other circumstances in determining entitlement to mitigating circumstance. The offender is not required to surrender at the first opportunity.

6. If the records do not clearly show that the offender voluntarily surrendered, that doubt cannot be resolved in their favor.

As to the voluntariness of his surrender, the SC emphasized that if he intended to evade arrest, he would not have returned to the NBI. While his first visit was to secure a clearance, his decision to return despite knowing there might be an active case shows his willingness to cooperate with the authorities.

The SC also clarified that while he knew about the pending case, there was no proof that he knew a warrant for his arrest had already been issued. It also noted the absence of any attempt to flee, his open use of his real name, and the fact that he returned to the NBI on his own.

The SC also reminded judges to avoid making quick or premature conclusions, emphasizing:

“What the Court asks and expects of magistrates on the frontlines of justice is to adjudge each case wholly, fully, and fairly as discerning persons learned in the law and literate in life experience, and not as cold-hearted automatons or soulless supercomputers, for even a single judge’s role in the administration of our penal laws can indeed have far-reaching consequences for the parties and for human society as a whole… The law may be harsh, but it need not be harsher.”

The accused’s sentence was reduced from a maximum of six years to a maximum of four years in prison.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160857

Read the full text of the Decision https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160836

Read the Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/258592-formerly-udk-no-17170-concurring-opinion-justice-alfredo-benjamin-s-caguioa/

The (SC) has ruled that same-sex couples who live together may be recognized as co-owners of property under Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦, provided there is proof of actual contribution.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC’s Second Division granted a woman’s complaint for partition of property and recognized her as a co-owner of the house and lot she shared with her same-sex partner.

Article 148 of the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governs the property relations of couples who are living together but cannot legally marry, acknowledging co-ownership based on their actual contributions.

The two women lived together as a couple. A year into their relationship, they purchased a house and lot, and agreed to register the property in one partner’s name to facilitate banking transactions.

Upon separation, they agreed to sell the property and divide the proceeds equally. One partner signed an 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 stating that the other had paid about 50% of the purchase and renovation costs.

However, she later refused to sell the property and denied that her former partner was a co-owner.

To protect her interest, the former partner annotated an adverse claim on the title and demanded partition of the property. When this failed, she filed a case for partition of real estate and damages, relying on the 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵 as proof of co-ownership.

The SC granted the complaint for partition of real estate, as it clarified the provisions in the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 governing the property relations of unmarried couples living together.

Article 147 applies to unmarried couples who may legally marry. Property acquired during their cohabitation is presumed jointly owned.

Article 148, on the other hand, applies to couples who are not permitted to marry. Only properties obtained through actual contribution are considered common property.

Since the 𝘍𝘢𝘮𝘪𝘭𝘺 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 only allows marriage between a man and a woman, the SC held that same-sex couples necessarily fall under Article 148.

Here, the SC found that the signed 𝘈𝘤𝘬𝘯𝘰𝘸𝘭𝘦𝘥𝘨𝘮𝘦𝘯𝘵, where one partner admitted that the other paid about half of the property costs, was a binding admission and sufficient proof of actual contribution. This established co-ownership.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160462.

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160431.

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160444.

Read the Concurrence of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=160439.

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

By a unanimous vote of all those participating, the (SC) En Banc, denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the House of Representatives, which sought to reverse the Court’s July 25, 2025 Decision that declared the Articles of Impeachment against Vice President Sara Z. Duterte unconstitutional.

It affirmed that the fourth impeachment complaint transmitted to the Senate on February 5, 2025 was already barred by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) of the Constitution. Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa took no part. Associate Justice Maria Filomena Singh was on leave.

The SC clarified the following points:

First, the first three impeachment complaints filed in accordance with the first mode of initiating an impeachment, that is Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), were not placed in the Order of Business within the required 10 session days.

"Session days" as used in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) or for purposes of the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint does not mean legislative session days. A session day for purposes of Article XI in the Constitution was given its plain and ordinary sense, which the Court interprets to mean a calendar day in which the House of Representatives holds a session.

Second, the SC reiterated Gutierrez v. House of Representatives. However, it further elaborated that an impeachment complaint filed in accordance with the first mode of impeachment, Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2), is deemed initiated for purposes of the one-year bar in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (5) when:

(a) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is referred to the Committee on Justice;

(b) a properly verified and endorsed impeachment complaint is not placed in the Order of Business of the House of Representatives within 10 session days, or referred to the Committee on Justice after it has been put in the Order of Business within three session days as required by Article XI, Section 3, subsection (2) of the Constitution; or

(c) no Articles of Impeachment are transmitted to the Senate before the House of Representatives adjourns sine die. This means that the initiation of an impeachment complaint must occur during the term of Congress.

Third, the SC affirmed the power of the House of Representatives to promulgate its own Rules on Impeachment. However, it clarified that Section 2 of the House Rules, as it is currently worded, requires the referral to the Committee on Justice even when filed through the second mode. The second mode is provided in Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) of the Constitution, where the endorsement of at least one-third of the members of the House of Representatives would be sufficient to transmit the Articles of Impeachment.

In view of the current wording of Section 2 of the Rules on Impeachment as drafted and promulgated by the House of Representatives in its 19th and 20th Congress, the House may—optionally upon its own prerogative—refer an impeachment complaint already endorsed by at least one-third of all its members to the Committee on Justice only for the following purposes:

(1) to ensure that the endorsement of the members of the House is verified;

(2) to confirm that the evidence supporting the grounds in the complaint exists, and that every member of the House has been given a copy of the complaint, as well as the evidence supporting it; and

(3) to respect the Committee’s prerogative to consolidate different formulations of the complaint, if any, so that only one complaint is endorsed to the plenary for transmittal to the Senate.

The SC observed that there is a fundamental difference between the first and second modes of initiating impeachment complaints. Thus, Article XI, Section 3, subsections (2) and (3) cover the first mode of initiating an impeachment complaint while Article XI, Section 3, subsection (4) covers the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint.

In the first mode, as contemplated under subsections (2) and (3), impeachment is initiated through the regular and deliberative process in the House of Representatives. A verified complaint may be filed either by a member of the House or by a private citizen with the endorsement of a member. Upon filing, the complaint is referred to the House Committee on Justice, which evaluates its sufficiency in form and substance and conducts the appropriate hearings. Only after favorable committee action does the impeachment process proceed further. This mode therefore emphasizes institutional screening and committee review.

By contrast, subsection (4) introduces an alternative and more direct mechanism for initiating impeachment. Under this provision, a verified complaint or resolution of impeachment signed by at least one-third of all the members of the House of Representatives immediately initiates impeachment proceedings.

These provisions reflect a deliberate constitutional design; subsections (2) and (3) provide a structured and committee-directed approach, while subsection (4) allows a streamlined initiation when a sufficient level of consensus already exists.”

Fourth, the Court affirmed that due process of law applies to the impeachment process. It stated that:

“The phrase ‘right to life, liberty, or property’ should not be read with undue literalism. It must be accorded reasonable flexibility to achieve its intent of protecting inherent and inalienable rights that could not have been exhaustively articulated at the time of its framing. The due process clause embodies the fundamental constitutional commitment to reasonableness, fairness, and non-arbitrariness. It envisions that we cannot have a true democratic and republican/representative state that is arbitrary and unfair.”

However, due process as it applies to the impeachment process is sui generis or a class of its own. Full-blown trial happens at the Senate. At least for the second mode of initiating an impeachment complaint, it only requires:

One. The grounds invoked in the complaint or resolution are those contained in Article XI, Section 2 of the Constitution.

Two. The procedure is governed by the Rules on Impeachment promulgated by the House of Representatives prior to any filing of any impeachment complaint.

Three. As already provided by the current House Rules on Impeachment, all endorsing members should have been given a copy of the complaint and all its supporting evidence.

The Court also noted that the transmittal of the Articles of Impeachment should be done in a plenary session of the House of Representatives, providing all the members of the House of Representatives with full copies of the complaint and its accompanying evidence mentioned in Rule IV, Section 14 of the House Rules on Impeachment.

Transmittal to the Senate, however, requires only a vote of one-third of its members for the first mode of initiating a complaint, or proof of the endorsement of a complaint by one-third of its members for the second mode.

Fifth, the operative fact doctrine cannot be invoked by the party directly responsible in the commission of an unconstitutional act. Thus, it does not apply in this case.

Finally, the Court noted all the motions for intervention and pleadings filed by individuals who were not parties to the case.

The Resolution is immediately executory upon digital service on all parties.

No further pleadings will be allowed.

Read the full text of the Press Briefer at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159965

Read the full text of the Resolution at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-sara-z-duterte-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al-atty-israelito-p-torreon-et-al-vs-house-of-representatives-et-al/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ramon-paul-l-hernando-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-henri-jean-paul-b-inting-2/

Read the Separate Concurring Opinion of Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-concurring-opinion-justice-ricardo-r-rosario/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-amy-c-lazaro-javier/

Read the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Raul B. Villanueva at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/278353-278359-separate-opinion-justice-raul-b-villanueva/

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

Sa sesyon ng En Banc ngayong Miyerkules, ika-28 ng Enero 2026, nagpasya ang Korte Suprema na kapag lampas na sa dalawang taon mula sa administrative reconstitution o muling pagsasaayos ng titulo ng lupa, hindi na kailangan ang paglalathala sa ilalim ng R.A. 26.

Sa Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, tinanggihan ng Korte ang petisyon na inihain ng Republika ng Pilipinas, sa pamamagitan ng Office of the Solicitor General, na kumuwestiyon sa pagpapatanggal ng annotation sa titulo sa lupa ni Antonio V. Mitra.

Si Mitra ay may-ari ng isang lupain sa Quezon City. Nang ipalagay na nawala o nasira ang kanyang Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT), nagsumite siya ng kahilingan para sa administratibong reconstitution ng titulo.

Alinsunod sa Republic Act (R.A.) Blg. 26, ang batas na namamahala sa reconstitution ng mga titulong nawala o nasira, ang naibalik na titulo ay may anotasyong nagsasaad na ito ay walang paglabag o pagkasira sa karapatan o interes ng sinumang partido na nakatala sa orihinal na kopya noong ito ay nawala o nasira.

Pagkalipas ng dalawampu’t pitong taon, humiling si Mitra sa Regional Trial Court (RTC) na ipabura ang anotasyon, sa dahilang wala namang sinumang nag-angkin o nagpakita ng interes sa ari-arian sa loob ng panahong iyon. Pinagbigyan ng RTC ang kahilingan at iniutos ang pagtanggal ng anotasyon. Pinagtibay naman ito ng Court of Appeals, na nagpasya na hindi na kailangan ang publikasyon at pagpapaskil dahil sa mahabang panahong lumipas mula nang ma-reconstitute ang titulo.

Bilang pag-sang-ayon sa Court of Appeals, ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na sa ilalim ng R.A. Blg. 26, kakailanganin lamang ang pagpapaskil at publikasyon kung ang petisyon para ipabura ang kinakailangang anotasyon ay inihain sa loob ng dalawang taon mula sa petsa ng administratibong reconstitution, at kung wala ring inihain na petisyon para maitala ang isang interes na maaaring nakaligtaan sa loob ng panahong iyon.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng Press Briefer sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159902.

Ang buong teksto ng Desisyon sa G.R. No. 264862, Republic of the Philippines v. Antonio V. Mitra, ay ilalathala sa website ng Korte Suprema sa sandaling ito ay maging available.

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

Isinantabi ng ang kasong adultery na inihain ng kinatawan ng isang lalaki laban sa kanyang asawa. Muling iginiit ng Korte na tanging ang mismong asawang nasaktan o naagrabyado ang may karapatang magsampa ng ganitong kaso.

Sa isang desisyong isinulat ni Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., binaliktad ng Ikalawang Dibisyon ng Korte Suprema ang pasya ng Regional Trial Court (RTC) na nag-utos na muling buksan ang kasong adultery laban kina Aurel Ann Chua-Chiba at kapwa-akusado na si Michael Llona.

Nagsampa, sa pamamagitan ng isang kinatawan, ng kasong adultery at grave threats si Jin Chiba laban sa asawa niyang si Aurel at kay Michael.

Hindi pinagbigyan ng Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) ang kasong adultery sa dahilang tanging ang mismong asawang naagrabyado lamang ang maaaring magsampa nito.

Binaliktad ng RTC ang desisyon ng MeTC at pinagtibay na tumugon sa mga pamantayang legal ang pagsasampa ng kaso, dahil nakalakip naman sa reklamong inihain ng kinatawan ni Jin ang mismong complaint-affidavit ni Jin.

Hindi ito sinang-ayunan ng Korte Suprema at muling iginiit na ang adultery ay isang pribadong krimen na maaari lamang usigin kung may reklamong inihain mismo ng asawang inagrabyado. Binanggit ng Korte ang Rule 110, Section 5, ng Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure at ang Article 344 ng Revised Penal Code (RPC).

Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na umiiral ang kahingiang ito “bilang paggalang sa panig na inagrabyado, na maaaring mas piliing tiisin na lamang nang tahimik ang dinanas na paglabag kaysa humarap sa eskandalo ng isang pampublikong paglilitis.” Pinahihintulutan ng batas ang asawang inagrabyado na magpasya kung dadalhin ba ang usapin sa hukuman o aayusin ito nang pribado.

Sa kasong ito, ang reklamong adultery ay hindi sinimulan ng mismong asawang inagrabyado kundi ng kanyang kinatawan. Bagaman nagsumite si Jin ng sarili niyang complaint-affidavit, ito ay isinama lamang bilang kalakip o annex sa reklamong inihain ng kanyang kinatawan.

Dahil hindi natugunan ang mga kahingian sa ilalim ng Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure at ng Revised Penal Code, itinuring ng Korte Suprema na walang wastong reklamo naisampa at tuluyan nitong ibinasura ang kaso.

Basahin ang kabuuan ng press release sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159759

Basahin ang kabuuang teksto ng Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159743

Basahin ang Concurring Opinion ni Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159748

Sumunod sa Credit Attribution Policy ng SC PIO: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

The (SC) has dismissed an adultery case filed by the representative of a married man, reiterating that only the offended spouse may file the complaint.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Antonio T. Kho, Jr., the SC’s Second Division dismissed the adultery charge filed by Jin Chiba, through a representative, against his wife, Aurel Ann Chua-Chiba and her co-accused Michael Llona. SC reversed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which had ordered the reinstatement of the adultery case against Aurel and Michael.

Aurel’s husband, Jin, through his representative, filed a complaint for adultery and grave threats against the two.

The Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) dismissed the adultery charge, citing that only the offended spouse can initiate it.

The RTC overturned the MeTC’s decision, confirming that the filing met legal standards because Jin’s complaint-affidavit was actually attached to the complaint submitted by his representative.

The SC disagreed and reiterated that adultery is a private crime that may be prosecuted only upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse, citing Rule 110, Section 5, of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦 and Article 344 of the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘗𝘦𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘊𝘰𝘥𝘦 (RPC).

The SC explained that this requirement exists “out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.” The law allows the offended spouse to decide whether to bring the matter to court or handle it privately.

In this case, the complaint for adultery was not initiated by the offended spouse but by his representative. Although Jin submitted his own complaint-affidavit, it was only included as an annex to his representative’s complaint.

Because there is failure to meet the requirement under the 𝘙𝘦𝘷𝘪𝘴𝘦𝘥 𝘙𝘶𝘭𝘦𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘊𝘳𝘪𝘮𝘪𝘯𝘢𝘭 𝘗𝘳𝘰𝘤𝘦𝘥𝘶𝘳𝘦 and the RPC, the SC held that no valid complaint was filed and dismissed the case.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159759

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159743

Read the Concurring Opinion of Senior Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=159748

Copying of this content is subject to the SC PIO’s Credit Attribution Policy: https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/credit-attribution-policy/.

Nagpasya ang na may paglabag sa karapatan sa agarang pagresolba ng kaso ang hindi makatwirang pagkaantala ng Commission on Elections (COMELEC) sa pag-iimbestiga ng isang election offense o paglabag sa mga batas panghalalan ng isang kandidato.

Sa isang Desisyon na isinulat ni Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, pinawalang-bisa ng En Banc ng Korte Suprema ang resolusyon ng COMELEC na nakakita ng probable cause para sampahan ng kaso si Sarigumba sa paglabag sa Omnibus Election Code.

Natalo si Sarigumba sa halalan sa pagka-alkalde ng Loboc, Bohol noong Mayo 2010. Pagkalipas ng apat na taon, nag-atas ang COMELEC Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) kay Sarigumba na magpaliwanag ukol sa diumano ay labis na paggastos batay sa kanyang Statement of Election Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE). Matapos niyang isumite ang kanyang paliwanag, naghain ang CFU ng reklamo laban sa kanya sa COMELEC noong Disyembre 2014.

Itinakda ang kaso para sa preliminary investigation noong Abril 14, 2015, subalit humiling si Sarigumba ng ilang pagpapaliban dahil sa kanyang karamdaman. Kalaunan, inatasan siya ng Law Department ng COMELEC na magsumite ng kanyang counter-affidavit noong Hulyo 11, 2015 pero nabigo siyang magsumite nito.

Pagkalipas ng anim na taon, pinagtibay ng COMELEC en banc, sa pamamagitan ng isang Resolusyon, ang rekomendasyon ng Law Department na sampahan si Sarigumba ng kaso ng labis na paggasta sa halalan sa Regional Trial Court.

Kinuwestiyon ni Sarigumba ang pagsampa ng kaso sa Korte Suprema at iginiit na nagkasala ang COMELEC ng undue delay o hindi makatwirang pagkaantala sa pag-iimbestiga ng kanyang kaso at nilabag nito ang kanyang karapatan sa agarang pagresolba ng kaso.

Iginiit ng COMELEC na bagama’t nagtatakda ang mga Rules of Procedure nito ng 20-araw na palugit para sa preliminary investigation, magsisimula lamang umano ang nasabing panahon sa sandaling magsumite ang respondent ng counter-affidavit. Dagdag pa ng COMELEC, tinalikuran na ni Sarigumba ang kanyang karapatan sa agarang pagresolba ng kaso dahil hindi siya lumahok sa mga pagdinig at binanggit lamang niya ito makalipas ang maraming taon.

Hindi sumang-ayon ang Korte Suprema at iginiit nito na ginagarantiyahan ang karapatan ng lahat ng tao sa agarang pagresolba ng mga kaso sa harap ng mga judicial, quasi-judicial, at administratibong mga lupon.

Binigyang-pansin ng Korte Suprema na mahigit anim na taon na ang lumipas mula nang atasan si Sarigumba na magsumite ng kanyang counter-affidavit pero nabigo ang COMELEC na tapusin at resolbahin ang preliminary investigation sa loob ng mga panahong itinakda ng sarili nitong mga alituntunin. Ang kabiguan ni Sarigumba na magsumite ng counter-affidavit ay hindi dahilan para sa matagal na kawalan ng aksyon ng COMELEC. Maituturing na kasalanan ng COMELEC ang anumang pagkaantala matapos ang paglipas ng panahon ng pagsumite ng counter-affidavit.

Ipinaliwanag ng Korte Suprema na sa ilalim ng COMELEC Rules of Procedure, dapat matapos sa loob ng 20 araw mula sa pagtanggap ng counter-affidavit ng respondent o mula sa paglipas ng itinakdang panahon para sa pagsumite nito ang preliminary investigation at dapat maglabas ito ng resolusyon sa loob ng limang araw.

Sinabi rin ng Korte Suprema na walang binigay na makatwirang paliwanag ang COMELEC para sa pagkaantala. Hindi rin komplikado ang kaso dahil ang pagtukoy ng probable cause ay ibinatay lamang sa SOCE ni Sarigumba.

Sa pagsantabi sa kaso laban kay Sarigumba, sinabi rin ng Korte Suprema na hindi maaaring sisihin si Sarigumba sa paggiit ng kanyang karapatan sa mabilis na pagresolba ng kanyang kaso dahil ang isang respondent sa isang kasong kriminal o imbestigasyon ay hindi obligadong subaybayan ang takbo ng kanyang kaso.

Basahin ang press release sa http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157693.

Basahin ang Desisyon sa https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157688.

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The (SC) has admonished Marikina City Regional Trial Court Judge Rey P. Inciong for his conduct during a parking-related incident involving a Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, Atty. Ivanheck U. Gatdula. A video of the incident was later shared on social media.

In a Decision written by Associate Justice Jhosep Y. Lopez, the SC En Banc found that Judge Inciong acted improperly when he publicly scolded Atty. Gatdula and demanded a public apology.

Judge Inciong was heard uttering demeaning remarks at Atty. Gatdula after the latter briefly parked his vehicle blocking an access ramp for persons with disabilities and a pedestrian pathway while he logged his attendance to avoid being marked late. Atty. Gatdula immediately apologized several times.

Despite this, Judge Inciong demanded a public apology from Atty. Gatdula. The judge later went to the PAO office, where he again insisted on the apology and lost his temper.

Atty. Gatdula and his supervisor said the judge’s remarks and actions were intimidating and unnecessary, especially since an apology had already been made. They also said that a public apology was no longer required.

The Office of the Court Administrator ordered Judge Inciong to explain his actions and initially recommended that he be reprimanded and sternly warned.

The matter was referred to the Judicial Integrity Board, which recommended that he be found guilty of the light offense of vulgar and unbecoming conduct under Canon VI, Section 35(b) of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability (CPRA).

In admonishing Judge Inciong, the Supreme Court recognized his intention to enforce order in the hall of justice but emphasized that this did not justify harsh language or aggressive behavior.

Citing Canons II (on Integrity) and IV (on Propriety) of the CPRA, the SC reminded judges that even when faced with improper conduct, they must still act with restraint and maintain the dignity of their office. Public confidence in the Judiciary, the SC said, depends on how judges behave.

The SC stressed that judges may exercise their right to free speech and expression, but they must do so within the limits of decency.

The SC observed that Judge Inciong’s conduct was his first offense and that he has maintained a clean record in public service since 1999. While the SC found him free from administrative liability, it issued a warning that future similar behavior will face more serious consequences.

Read the full text of the press release at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157802

Read the full text of the Decision at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157776

Read the Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao at https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/?p=157789

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