US Chemical Safety Board

Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released a new safety video on its investigation into the serious November 2019 incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant in Port Neches, Texas. A series of explosions destroyed a portion of the TPC facility, damaged nearby homes and businesses, and prompted a mandatory evacuation of residents living within four miles of the plant. Several workers and members of the public reported injuries and fires burned at the facility for over a month. The incident caused $450 million in on-site property damage and $153 million in off-site property damage to nearby homes and businesses. Media reports indicated that the blast was felt up to 30 miles away.

The CSB's new safety video, called “The Danger of Popcorn Polymer: Incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant,” includes an animation of the events leading to the incident, and interviews with both CSB Board Member Dr. Sylvia Johnson and the CSB’s Lead Investigator for the incident, Butch Griffin.

The CSB’s investigation found that the incident at the TPC plant was the result of inadequate management of a hazard called “popcorn polymer,” which is well known to plants, such as TPC, that handle or produce butadiene. The popcorn polymer grew and formed inside a “dead leg” in piping that was created when a process pump was taken out of service for several months. Over a period of 114 days, without recognition by the plant, the popcorn polymer exponentially expanded inside the dead leg until pressure caused the piping section to rupture, releasing flammable butadiene that quickly exploded.

In the safety video Board Member Johnson states, “The incident at TPC was the result of a known hazard where popcorn polymer grew and formed inside equipment that was poorly managed and controlled at the facility. Gaps in industry good guidance on the management of popcorn polymer formation played a role. The result was a catastrophic incident that disrupted life at the facility as well as the local community.”

As in the CSB’s final report, the safety video covers the four key safety issues that contributed to the incident. They are: (i) dead leg identification and control, (ii) process hazard analysis action item implementation, (iii) control and prevention of popcorn polymer, and (iv) remotely operated emergency isolation valves. The video also highlights safety recommendations made by the CSB to the TPC Group as well as the American Chemistry Council.

Board Member Johnson closes the video by saying, “We believe our final report and recommendations will help facilities that handle and store large quantities of butadiene better control popcorn polymer formation and growth within their processes. Doing so can prevent another terrible incident like the one that occurred at TPC.”

The Danger of Popcorn Polymer: Incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant A CSB safety video on the November 2019 incident at the TPC Group Chemical Plant in Port Neches, Texas. A series of explosions destroyed a portion of the TPC...

Today, the CSB released a new safety video on its investigation into the April 2018 explosion and fire at the Husky Superior Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin. The incident injured 36 workers, caused roughly $550 million in damage to the facility and released 39,000 pounds of flammable hydrocarbon v***r into the air. Over 2,500 residents of the City of Superior were evacuated from their homes, and the City of Duluth, Minnesota, issued a shelter in place order.

At the time of the incident, the Superior Refinery was owned by Husky Energy, which had purchased the refinery less than six months earlier in November 2017. In 2021, Husky Energy merged with Cenovus Energy.

The CSB's new safety video includes an animation of the series of events leading to the incident, and interviews with both the CSB’s Chairperson Steve Owens and Lead Investigator, Melike Yersiz.

The incident at the Superior Refinery occurred while the refinery was shutting down its fluid catalytic cracking (FCC) unit to perform planned maintenance. Two vessels within the FCC unit exploded sending debris flying into the air. One piece traveled about 200 feet and hit a large aboveground storage tank, puncturing the side of the tank, and releasing hot asphalt. The asphalt later ignited causing a huge fire.

In the safety video Chairperson Steve Owens states, “Refinery shutdowns, as well as startups, can be particularly dangerous because processes are not in normal operation mode. Our investigation found that critical safeguards were not in place during this shutdown, and the procedures followed at the refinery were not correct. The result was a massive explosion and fire that injured dozens of workers, caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damage, and threatened surrounding communities.”

The CSB’s final report notes that in addition to smoke from the fires at the refinery, the City of Superior’s evacuation was based on the potential risk of a release of highly toxic hydrofluoric acid (HF), which was stored and used at the refinery. Although no HF release occurred, the HF storage tank was about 150 feet away from the two vessels that exploded, about 50 feet closer than the asphalt storage tank that was damaged. Therefore, the CSB considers this incident to be a serious near miss that, had an HF release occurred, could have been much worse.

Chairperson Owens closes the video by saying, “The incident at the Superior Refinery should serve as a wakeup call to other refineries, especially those that have hydrofluoric acid alkylation units. During transient operations, refineries must have necessary safeguards in place -- and follow correct procedures -- to prevent disasters from occurring.”

Transient Hazards: Explosion at the Husky Superior Refinery A CSB safety video about the April 2018 explosion and fire at the Husky Superior Refinery in Superior, Wisconsin. The incident injured 36 workers, caused rou...

The CSB recently released "Ignored Warnings: Explosion in St. Louis," a new safety video about the fatal explosion that occurred on April 3, 2017, at the Loy-Lange Box Company in St Louis, Missouri. The incident occurred when a severely corroded pressure vessel catastrophically failed, causing an explosion that launched the pressure vessel into a neighboring building. One worker and three members of the public were fatally injured.

The safety video includes an animation of the sequence of events leading to the incident, and interviews with both the CSB’s Interim Executive Steve Owens and Lead Investigator Drew Sahli.

During its investigation, the CSB found that over the course of many years, an area of the failed pressure vessel had thinned due to a known corrosion mechanism that was poorly controlled at Loy-Lange. And the CSB found that Loy-Lange repeatedly ignored clear warnings that corrosion was causing major problems within its operations. In fact, the CSB found that prior to its failure, Loy-Lange ran the pressure vessel normally despite knowing that it was leaking.

In the video, Interim Executive Owens summarizes the CSB findings: “The incident at Loy-Lange resulted from a tragic series of circumstances -- ineffective corrosion management, inadequate pressure vessel repair, a lack of inspections, and the absence of sound safety management systems. The result of those factors was that a severely corroded pressure vessel, which presented a serious safety hazard, was allowed to operate until it ultimately failed, resulting in the death of four people."

The potential for corrosion was a well-known problem at Loy-Lange. During its time operating the pressure vessel that failed, Loy-Lange experienced at least three leaks due to corrosion. In response to a 2012 leak, a repair company removed most of the area of the pressure vessel where the failure occurred. The company patched it with new steel but left some of the original steel in place. The original steel, however, was also thinned from corrosion, and between 2012 and 2017, it continued to degrade. The CSB found that it was the unacceptably thin remaining material from that repair that failed, initiating the incident.

The CSB also learned that Loy-Lange never applied for an installation or repair permit for the pressure vessel, or otherwise registered the vessel with the city of St. Louis. Therefore, although the City required annual inspections of boilers and pressure vessels, the CSB found that there was no record of a city inspector ever having inspected the pressure vessel. The CSB also found, however, that the City also did not inspect the Loy-Lange steam generators as frequently as required by the City’s code and therefore missed opportunities to identify the unpermitted pressure vessel that was in close proximity to one of the Loy-Lange steam generators.

Interim Executive Owens concludes the video saying, “Leaking pressure vessels can be dangerous and should be thoroughly evaluated to ensure they are fit to operate. But even before a pressure vessel is compromised there are many ways for companies to ensure that damage mechanisms, including corrosion, are properly understood and controlled. Doing so can prevent catastrophic incidents before they ever happen.”

Ignored Warnings: Explosion in St. Louis A CSB safety video about the fatal explosion that occurred on April 3, 2017, at the Loy-Lange Box Company in St Louis, Missouri. The incident occurred when a...

Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) released a new safety video about the fire, explosions, and toxic hydrofluoric acid (HF) release that occurred at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions (PES) refinery in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on June 21, 2019. The incident caused the release of over 5,000 pounds of highly toxic HF, launched a 38,000-pound vessel fragment off-site, and resulted in an estimated property damage loss of 750 million dollars.

The safety video includes an animation of the sequence of events leading to the incident, and comments from the CSB’s Interim Executive Authority Steve Owens and Lead Investigator Lauren Grim.

At PES, a pipe elbow catastrophically failed due to hydrofluoric acid corrosion, which is a well-known safety hazard. Flammable process fluid escaped through the ruptured pipe elbow. Upon release, the process fluid formed a large ground-hugging v***r cloud about ten feet high that engulfed a portion of the refinery’s HF alkylation unit. The cloud ignited, causing the fire and series of explosions.

Because of the fire, a critical safeguard intended to protect the local community from a release of HF did not function as designed. HF is a highly toxic chemical that is particularly hazardous if a release occurs because it v***rizes, becoming airborne. Breathing HF can cause lung damage and skin contact with HF can cause severe burns and death. If a large amount of hydrofluoric acid had escaped from the refinery, the consequences for the surrounding community could have been disastrous.

In the video, Interim Executive Authority Owens says, “Thankfully, despite the urban location of the PES Refinery, the local community was not seriously harmed. But it could have been worse. This incident should be a wake-up call to industry and regulators to take every step possible to prevent a similar event from occurring.”

In its report, the CSB made recommendations to the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The recommendations are aimed strengthening industry standards and regulations regarding several key safety issues found at PES including a lack of remotely operated emergency isolation valves, the need to ensure safeguard reliability in HF alkylation units, and the consideration of inherently safer design.

Wake Up Call: Refinery Disaster in Philadelphia A CSB safety video about the June 21, 2019, fire, explosions, and toxic hydrofluoric acid (HF) release at the Philadelphia Energy Solutions refinery in Phila...

This week, the CSB released guidance on the agency’s “Accidental Release Reporting Rule,” which went into effect in March 2020. The new guidance is provided so that owners and operators of facilities involved in the production, processing, handling, or storage of chemical substances may better understand the rule and comply with the requirement to submit a report to the CSB within eight hours after an accidental release has occurred that results in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damage.

The CSB’s guidance document clarifies key terms found in the reporting regulation, such as what constitutes regulated substances for the reporting requirement and the threshold amounts related to property damage for which reporting is required. The guidance also addresses specific scenarios and emphasizes that if an owner or operator is unsure about whether to report a release to the CSB, they should do so, rather than risk violating the rule by failing to report. The guidance makes clear that while there is no sanction for reporting an accidental release that, in retrospect, did not have to be reported, the failure to make a required report could result in an enforcement action.

CSB Interim Executive Steve Owens said, “Our goal is to make sure that owners and operators report chemical releases to the CSB as required by law. While many companies already have been complying with the rule and submitting their required reports, this guidance should help resolve any uncertainties about the reporting requirement. If someone is unsure about what to do, they should report, rather than risk violating the rule.”

In July 2022, the CSB released its first set of data collected from the reporting rule, which includes all of the reportable events received by the CSB since the rule went into effect. The CSB’s data is comprised of 162 incidents, of which 25 resulted in fatalities. In addition, 92 of the events resulted in serious injuries, and there were 68 instances of substantial property damage.

The CSB guidance document can be found here:

https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/17/csb_guidance_on_accidental_release_reporting.p​df?16818

Full text of the regulation governing the reporting of accidental release can be found at title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1604, Reporting of Accidental Releases:

https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-VI/part-1604 #1604.3​

Visit the CSB’s Accidental Release Reporting Rule webpage at:

https://www.csb.gov/news/incident-report-rule-form-/

Incident Reporting Rule Submission Information and Data - Incident Reporting Rule | CSB

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Today, the CSB published Accidental Release Reporting Rule Data. You may access the current list of reportable events here:

https://www.csb.gov/assets/1/6/Accidental_Release_Events_2022-05-13.xlsx

The CSB’s Accidental Release Database includes all accidental release incidents reported since March 23, 2020, the effective date of the Accidental Release Reporting regulation.

The regulation governing the reporting of accidental release can be found at title 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1604, Reporting of Accidental Releases:

https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-40/chapter-VI/part-1604 #1604.3

The regulation requires the owner or operator of a stationary source to report any accidental release resulting in a fatality, serious injury, or substantial property damage​s. The purpose of this part is to require prompt notification of any accidental release within the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s (CSB's) investigatory jurisdiction.

The database is revised quarterly and may include revisions or corrections to events previously reported and events that were not timely reported to the CSB in accordance with the regulation.

Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released a new safety video on its investigation into a massive explosion and fire that occurred in May of 2019 at the AB Specialty Silicones facility in Waukegan, IL. The incident killed four workers, destroyed the facility, and caused extensive damage to nearby businesses.

The CSB's new safety video includes an animation of the events leading up to the incident, and interviews with both the CSB’s Chairperson and Lead Investigator.

At AB Specialty Silicones, two incompatible chemicals were mixed during production of an emulsion product. The chemicals reacted and produced flammable hydrogen gas that ignited, causing the fatal explosion.

The incident is one of many investigated by the CSB during the agency’s history that resulted from inadequate recognition and evaluation of reactive chemical hazards. In its report, the agency made recommendations to AB Specialty Silicones and reiterated recommendations to the Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency with the goal of addressing the regulatory gap covering reactive chemicals.

Chairperson Lemos concludes the video by saying, “It is past time for regulators to fully recognize the hazards presented by reactive chemicals. We call on OSHA and EPA to update their regulatory standards to include better coverage of reactive chemicals. Closing the regulatory gap will prevent further tragic incidents and save lives. Together, we can impact safety for our chemical industries, our workers, our community, and our environment.”

Incompatible Chemicals: Explosion at AB Specialty Silicones A CSB safety video about the May 3, 2019, reactive chemistry incident at the AB Specialty Silicones manufacturing facility in Waukegan, Illinois. Two incompa...

Today, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released a new safety video about a fatal incident at the Evergreen Packaging paper mill in Canton, North Carolina. On September 21, 2020, a fire erupted in a confined space when a heat gun fell into a bucket of flammable resin killing two contract workers.

The CSB's safety video includes an animation of the events leading up to the incident, and interviews with both the CSB’s Chairperson and Supervisory Investigator.

The video notes that during its investigation into the incident, the CSB identified four safety issues that led to the incident at Evergreen Packaging: hot work safety, pre-job planning, confined space safety, and combustible materials of vessel construction.

As a result of its investigation, the agency made recommendations to Evergreen Packaging, the Occupation Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and Blastco – the contract company involved in the incident – to address those safety issues.

Chairperson Lemos concludes the video by saying, “We hope our report and recommendations will further inform industry about the risks inherent to hot work and confined space activities, and how those risks can be successfully mitigated.”

Simultaneous Tragedy: Fire at Evergreen Packaging This CSB safety video highlights the Agency's investigation into the September 21, 2020, fire at the Evergreen Packaging Paper Mill in Canton, North Carolina...